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Abstract
This paper is an axiomatic study of consistent approval-based multi-winner
rules, i.e., voting rules that select a fixed-size group of candidates based on ap-
proval ballots. We introduce the class of counting rules and provide an axiomatic
characterization of this class based on the consistency axiom. Building upon this
result, we axiomatically characterize three important consistent multi-winner rules:
Proportional Approval Voting, Multi-Winner Approval Voting and the Approval
Chamberlin–Courant rule. Our results demonstrate the variety of multi-winner
rules and illustrate three different, orthogonal principles that multi-winner voting
rules may represent: individual excellence, diversity, and proportionality.
1 Introduction
In Arrow’s foundational book “Social Choice and Individual Values” (Arrow, 1951), vot-
ing rules rank candidates according to their social merit and, if desired, this ranking can
be used to select the best candidate(s). As these rules are concerned with “mutually
exclusive” candidates, they can be seen as single-winner rules. In contrast, the goal of
multi-winner rules is to select the best group of candidates of a given size; we call such
a fixed-size set of candidates a committee. Multi-winner elections are of importance in a
wide range of scenarios, which often fit in, but are not limited to, one of the following
three categories (Elkind et al., 2017; Faliszewski et al., 2017). The first category contains
multi-winner elections aiming for proportional representation. The archetypal example of
a multi-winner election is that of selecting a representative body such as a parliament,
where a fixed number of seats are to be filled; and these seats are ideally filled so as to
proportionally represent the population of voters. Hence, voting rules used in parliamen-
tary elections typically follow the intuitive principle of proportionality, i.e., the chosen
subset of candidates should proportionally reflect the voters’ preferences. The second
category comprises multi-winner elections with the goal that as many voters as possible
∗This work was presented at EC’18, the 19th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation; an
abstract was published in the proceedings (Lackner and Skowron, 2018a).
1
should have an acceptable representative in the committee. Consequently, there is no or
little weight put on giving voters a second representative in the committee. Ensuring a
representative for as many voters as possible can be viewed as an egalitarian objective.
This goal may be desirable, e.g., in a deliberative democracy (Chamberlin and Courant,
1983), where it is more important to represent the diversity of opinions in an elected com-
mittee rather than to include multiple members representing the same popular opinion.
Another example would be the distribution of facilities such as hospitals in a country,
where voters would prefer to have a hospital close to their home but are less interested in
having more than one in their vicinity. Voting rules suitable in such scenarios follow the
principle of diversity. The third category contains scenarios where the goal is to choose a
fixed number of best candidates and where ballots are viewed as expert judgments. Here,
the chosen multi-winner rule should follow the individual excellence principle, i.e., to se-
lect candidates with the highest total support of the experts. An example is shortlisting
nominees for an award or finalists in a contest where a nomination itself is often viewed
as an achievement.
In this paper, we consider multi-winner rules based on approval ballots, which allow
voters to express dichotomous preferences. Dichotomous preferences distinguish between
approved and disapproved candidates—a dichotomy. An approval ballot thus corresponds
to a subset of (approved) candidates. A simple example of an approval-based election can
highlight the distinct nature of proportionality, diversity, and individual excellence: There
are 100 voters and 5 candidates {a, b, c, d, e}: 66 voters approve the set {a, b, c}, 33 voters
approve {d}, and one voter approves {e}. Assume we want to select a committee of size
three. If we follow the principle of proportionality, we could choose, e.g., {a, b, d}; this
committee reflects as closely as possible the proportions of voter support. If we aim for
diversity and do not consider it important to give voters more than one representative, we
may choose the committee {a, d, e}; this committee contains one approved candidate of
every voter. The principle of individual excellence aims to select the strongest candidates:
a, b, and c have most supporters and are thus a natural choice, although the opinions
of 34 voters are essentially ignored. We see that these three intuitive principles give rise
to very different committees. In this paper, we will explore these principles in a formal,
mathematical framework.
For single-winner rules, one distinguishes between social welfare functions, i.e., voting
rules that output a ranking of candidates, and social choice functions, i.e., rules that
output a single winner or a set of tied winners. For multi-winner rules, an analogous
classification applies: we distinguish between approval-based committee (ABC) ranking
rules, which produce a ranking of all committees, and ABC choice rules, which output a
set of winning committees. While axiomatic questions are well explored for both social
choice and social welfare functions, far fewer results are known for multi-winner rules (we
provide an overview of the related literature in Section 1.2). However, such an axiomatic
exploration of multi-winner rules is essential if one wants to choose a multi-winner rule
in a principled way. Axiomatic characterizations of multi-winner rules are of crucial
importance because multi-winner rules may have very different objectives: as we have seen
in the example, proportionality, diversity, and individual excellence may be conflicting
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goals.
The main goal of this paper is to explore the class of consistent ABC ranking rules.
An ABC ranking rule is consistent if the following holds: if two disjoint societies decide
on the same set of candidates and if both societies prefer committee W1 to a committee
W2, then the union of these two societies should also prefer W1 to W2. This is a straight-
forward adaption of consistency as defined for single-winner rules by Smith (1973) and
Young (1974a). Our results highlight the diverse landscape of consistent multi-winner
rules and their defining and widely varying properties.
1.1 Main results
The first main result of this paper is an axiomatic characterization of ABC counting rules,
which are a subclass of ABC ranking rules. ABC counting rules are informally defined as
follows: given a real-valued function f(x, y) (the so-called counting function), a committee
W receives a score of f(x, y) from every voter for whom committeeW contains x approved
candidates and who approves y candidates in total; the ABC counting rule implemented
by f ranks committees according to the sum of scores obtained from all voters. We obtain
the following characterization.
Theorem 1. An ABC ranking rule is an ABC counting rule if and only if it satisfies
symmetry, consistency, weak efficiency, and continuity.
The axioms used in this theorem can be intuitively described as follows: We say
that a rule is symmetric if the names of voters and candidates do not affect the result
of an election. Weak efficiency informally states that candidates that no one approves
cannot be “better” committee members than candidates that are approved by some voter.
Continuity is a more technical condition that states that a sufficiently large majority can
dictate a decision. As weak efficiency is satisfied by every sensible multi-winner rule and
continuity typically only rules out the use of certain tie-breaking mechanisms (Smith,
1973; Young, 1975), Theorem 1 essentially implies that ABC counting rules correspond
to symmetric and consistent ABC ranking rules. Furthermore, we show that the set of
axioms used to characterize ABC counting rules is minimal.
Theorem 1 gives a powerful technical tool that allows to obtain further axiomatic
characterizations of more specific rules. Indeed, building upon this result, we explore
the space of ABC counting rules, and obtain our second main result—the axiomatic
explanation of the differences between three important rules: Multi-Winner Approval
Voting (AV), Proportional Approval Voting (PAV), and Approval Chamberlin–Courant
(CC), which are defined by the following counting functions:
fAV(x, y) = x; fPAV(x, y) =
x∑
i=1
1/i; fCC(x, y) =
{
0 if x = 0,
1 if x ≥ 1.
Note that these three specific example of counting functions do not depend on the pa-
rameter y; we discuss this fact in Section 3.1. These three well-known rules are prime
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examples of multi-winner systems following the principle of individual excellence, propor-
tionality, and diversity, respectively. Our results imply that the differences between these
three voting rules can be understood by studying how these rules behave when viewed
as apportionment methods. Apportionment methods are a well-studied special case of
approval-based multi-winner voting, where the set of candidates can be represented as a
disjoint union of groups (intuitively, each group can be viewed as a political party), and
where each voter approves all candidates within one of these groups (which can be viewed
as voting for a single party)—we refer to preference profiles that can be represented in
such way as party-list profiles. For these mathematically much simpler profiles it is easier
to formalize the principles of individual excellence, proportionality and diversity:
Disjoint equality states that if each candidate is approved by at most one voter, then
any committee consisting of approved candidates is a winning committee. One can
argue that the principle of individual excellence implies disjoint equality: if every
candidate is approved only once, then every approved candidate has the same support,
their “quality” cannot be distinguished, and hence all approved candidates are equally
well suited for selection.
D’Hondt proportionality defines a way in which parliamentary seats are assigned to
parties in a proportional manner. The D’Hondt method (also known as Jefferson
method) is one of the most commonly used methods of apportionment in parliamentary
elections.
Disjoint diversity states that as many parties as possible should receive one seat and, if
necessary, priority is given to stronger parties. In contrast to D’Hondt proportionality,
there are no guarantees for strong parties to receive more than one seat.
We show that Multi-Winner Approval Voting is the only ABC counting rule that satisfies
disjoint equality, Proportional Approval Voting is the only ABC counting rule satisfy-
ing D’Hondt proportionality and that Approval Chamberlin–Courant is the only ABC
counting rule satisfying disjoint diversity. Together with Theorem 1, these results lead to
unconditional axiomatic characteriza-
tions of AV, PAV, and CC. In particular, our results show that Proportional Approval
Voting is essentially the only consistent extension of the D’Hondt method to the more
general setting where voters decide on individual candidates rather than on parties. Our
proof strategy for this result is general and can be applied to other forms of proportionality,
e.g., square-root proportionality as proposed by Penrose (1946).
Our results illustrate the variety of ABC ranking rules, even within the class of con-
sistent ABC ranking rules. This variety is due to their defining counting function f(x, y);
see Figure 1 for a visualization. Our results indicate that counting functions that have a
larger slope than fPAV put more emphasis on majorities and thus become less egalitarian,
whereas counting functions that have a smaller slope than fPAV treat minorities preferen-
tially and thus approach the Approval Chamberlin–Courant rule. In particular, we show
that counting functions that are not “close” to fPAV (all those not contained in the gray
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Figure 1: Different counting functions and their corresponding ABC counting rules.
Counting functions outside the gray area fail the lower quota axiom; see Section 4.4
for a formal statement.
area around fPAV in Figure 1) implement ABC ranking rules that violate a rather weak
form of proportionality called lower quota.
All characterizations mentioned so far hold for ABC ranking rules. We demonstrate
the generality of our results by proving that the characterizations of Proportional Ap-
proval Voting and Approval Chamberlin–Courant also hold for ABC choice rules. The
method used for this proof is however not applicable to Multi-Winner Approval Voting.
Thus, characterizing ABC counting rules within the class of ABC choice rules remains as
important future work.
Finally, we note that Theorem 1 can be used to obtain many further characterizations
of interesting multi-winner rules. E.g., by using axioms relating to strategy-proofness one
can characterize the classes of Thiele methods, and dissatisfaction counting rules (Lackner
and Skowron, 2018b).
1.2 Related Work
Electing a representative body such as a parliament is perhaps the most classic example
of a multi-winner election; we refer to the books of Farrell (2011), and Renwick and
Pilet (2016) for an overview of multi-winner elections in a political context. In recent
years, there has been an emerging interest in multi-winner elections from the computer
science community. In this context, multi-winner election rules have been analyzed and
applied in a variety of scenarios: personalized recommendation and advertisement (Lu
and Boutilier, 2011, 2015), group recommendation (Skowron et al., 2016), diversifying
search results (Skowron et al., 2017), improving genetic algorithms (Faliszewski et al.,
2016a), and the broad class of facility location problems (Farahani and Hekmatfar, 2009;
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Skowron et al., 2016). In all these settings, multi-winner voting either appears as a core
problem itself or can help to improve or analyze mechanisms and algorithms. For an
overview of this literature we refer the reader to a recent survey by Faliszewski, Skowron,
Slinko, and Talmon (2017).
The most important axiomatic concept in our study is consistency. In the context of
social welfare functions, this axiom informally states that if two disjoint societies both
prefer candidate a over candidate b, then the union of these two societies should also prefer
a over b, i.e., consistency refers to consistent behavior with respect to varying populations,
referred to as population-consistency in other contexts. Smith (1973) and Young (1974a)
independently introduced this axiom and characterized the class of positional scoring rules
as the only social welfare functions that satisfy symmetry, consistency, and continuity.
Subsequently, Young (1975) also proved an analogous result for social choice functions,
i.e., voting rules that return the set of winning candidates. Furthermore, Myerson (1995)
and Pivato (2013) characterized positional scoring rules with the same set of axioms
but without imposing any restriction on the input of voting rules, i.e., ballots are not
restricted to be a particular type of order. Extensive studies led to further, more specific,
characterizations of consistent voting rules (Chebotarev and Shamis, 1998; Merlin, 2003).
The impressive body of axiomatic studies shows that single-winner voting is largely
well-understood and characterized. Axiomatic properties of multi-winner rules are con-
siderably fewer in number. Debord (1992) characterized the k-Borda rule using similar
axioms as Young (1974b). Felsenthal and Maoz (1992) and Elkind, Faliszewski, Skowron,
and Slinko (2017) formulated a number of axiomatic properties of multi-winner rules,
and analyzed which multi-winner voting rules satisfy these axioms; however, they do not
obtain axiomatic characterizations. Elkind et al. (2017) also defined the class of com-
mittee scoring rules, which aims at generalizing single-winner positional scoring rules
to the multi-winner setting. This broad class contains, among others, the Chamberlin–
Courant rule (Chamberlin and Courant, 1983). In recent work, Skowron, Faliszewski,
and Slinko (2019) showed that the class of committee scoring rules admits a similar ax-
iomatic characterization as their single-winner counterparts—this result plays a major
role in the proof of Theorem 1. Faliszewski, Skowron, Slinko, and Talmon (2016b; 2016c)
further studied the internal structure of committee scoring rules and characterized several
multi-winner rules within this class.
A central concept in the study of multi-winner elections is proportionality. Proportion-
ality is well-understood for party-list elections; the corresponding mathematical problem
is called the apportionment problem. It typically arises when allocating seats to political
parties based on the number of votes. For an overview of the literature on apportionment
we refer the reader to the comprehensive books by Balinski and Young (1982) and by
Pukelsheim (2014).
The concept of proportionality in arbitrary multi-winner elections (i.e., in the absence
of parties) is more elusive. The first study of proportional representation in multi-winner
voting dates back to Black (1958), who informally defined proportionality as the ability
to reflect shades of a society’s political opinion in the elected committee. Later, Dum-
mett (1984) proposed an axiom of proportionality for multi-winner rules that accept linear
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orders as input; it is based on the top-ranked candidates in voters’ rankings. An insightful
discussion on the need for notions of proportionality that are applicable to linear order
preferences can be found in the seminal work of Monroe (1995); he referred to such con-
cepts as fully proportional representation since they are to take “full” preferences into
account. More recently, axiomatic properties for approval-based rules have been pro-
posed that aim at capturing the concept of proportional representation (Aziz et al., 2017;
Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al., 2017). This body of research demonstrates that the concept of
proportionality can be sensibly defined and discussed in the context of multi-winner rules,
even though this setting is more intricate and mathematically complex than the party-list
setting. It is noteworthy that the results in our paper (in particular Theorem 2) show that
for obtaining axiomatic characterizations it is in general not necessary to rely on propor-
tionality definitions considering the full domain; proportionality defined in the restricted
party-list setting—i.e., proportionality as defined for the apportionment problem—may
be sufficient for characterizing multi-winner rules.
There also exist more critical works raising arguments against the use of classical (i.e.,
linear) proportionality for electing representative assemblies. One class of critical argu-
ments arises from the analysis of issues related to the concept of voting power (Felsenthal
and Machover, 1998). The second main objection comes from the analysis of probabilistic
models describing how the decisions made by the elected committee map to the satisfac-
tion of individual voters participating in the process of electing the committee (Koriyama
et al., 2013). This kind of analysis often gives arguments in favor of other concepts such
as “degressive” proportionality. In Section 5 we will explain that our results can be easily
extended to apply to such other forms of (dis)proportionality.
1.3 Structure of the Paper
This paper is structured as follows: We briefly state preliminary definitions in Section 2.
Section 3 contains a formal introduction of ABC counting rules, their defining set of
axioms, and the statement of our main technical tool (Theorem 1). In Section 4, we
discuss and prove theorems that explore how different axioms of (dis)proportionality yield
specific ABC counting rules. Finally, in Section 5 we summarize the big picture of this
paper. As this paper contains a large number of proofs, we have moved substantial parts
into appendices. Appendix A contains the main technical and most complex part of this
paper, the proof of Theorem 1. Appendix B contains omitted proofs for non-essential
lemmas and propositions. Appendix C contains a technical note on the disjoint equality
axiom as used in Theorem 3. In Appendix D, we show how to translate some of our
results from the setting of ABC ranking rules to ABC choice rules.
2 Preliminaries
We write [n] to denote the set {1, . . . , n} and [i, j] to denote {i, i+1, . . . , j} for i ≤ j ∈ N.
For a set X , let P(X) denote the powerset of X , i.e., the set of subsets of X . Further,
for each ℓ let Pℓ(X) denote the set of all size-ℓ subsets of X . A weak order of X is a
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binary relation that is transitive and complete (all elements of X are comparable), and
thus also reflexive. A linear order is a weak order that is antisymmetric. We write W (X)
to denote the set of all weak orders of X and L (X) to denote the set of all linear orders
of X .
Approval profiles. Let C = {c1, . . . , cm} be a set of candidates. We identify voters with
natural numbers, i.e., N is the set of all possible voters. For each finite subset of voters
V = {v1, . . . , vn} ⊂ N, an approval profile over V , A = (A(v1), . . . , A(vn)), is an n-tuple
of subsets of C. For v ∈ V , let A(v) ⊆ C denote the subset of candidates approved
by voter v. We write A(C, V ) to denote the set of all possible approval profiles over V
and A(C) = {A(C, V ) : V ⊂ N and V is finite} to be the set of all approval profiles
(for the fixed candidate set C). Given a permutation σ : C → C and an approval profile
A ∈ A(C, V ), we write σ(A) to denote the profile (σ(A(v1)), . . . , σ(A(vn))).
Let V = {v1, . . . , vs} ⊆ N and V
′ = {v′1, . . . , v
′
t} ⊆ N. For A ∈ A(C, V ) and
A′ ∈ A(C, V ′), we write A + A′ to denote the profile B ∈ A(C, [s + t]) defined as
B = (A(v1), . . . , A(vs), A
′(v′1), . . . , A
′(v′t)). For a positive integer n, we write nA to denote
A+ A + · · ·+ A, n times.
Approval-based committee ranking rules. Let k denote the desired size of the
committee to be formed. We refer to elements of Pk(C) as committees. Throughout the
paper, we assume that both k and C (and thus m) are arbitrary but fixed. Furthermore,
to avoid trivialities, we assume k < m.
An approval-based committee ranking rule (ABC ranking rule), F : A(C)→ W (Pk(C)),
maps approval profiles to weak orders over committees. Note that C and k are param-
eters for ABC ranking rules but since we assume that C and k are fixed, we omit them
to alleviate notation. For an ABC ranking rule F and an approval profile A, we write
F(A) to denote the weak order F(A). For W1,W2 ∈ Pk(C), we write W1 ≻F(A) W2 if
W1 F(A) W2 and not W2 F(A) W1, and we write W1 =F(A) W2 if W1 F(A) W2 and
W2 F(A) W1. A committee is a winning committee if it is a maximal element with respect
to F(A).
An approval-based committee choice rule (ABC choice rule), F : A(C)→ P(Pk(C))\
{∅}, maps approval profiles to sets of committees, again referred to as winning committees.
As before, C and k are parameters for ABC choice rules but we omit them from our
notation. Note that each ABC ranking rule naturally defines an ABC choice rule by
returning all top-ranked committees. In contrast, ABC choice rules do not immediately
translate to ABC ranking rules, since the relative ranking of losing committees is not
known.
An ABC ranking rule is trivial if for all A ∈ A(C) and W1,W2 ∈ Pk(C) it holds
that W1 =F(A) W2. An ABC choice rule is trivial if for all A ∈ A(C) it holds that
F(A) = Pk(C).
Let us now list some important examples of ABC ranking rules. For some of these
rules it was already mentioned in the introduction that they belong to the class of ABC
counting rules; we discuss this classification in detail in Section 3 and also give their
defining counting functions. The definitions provided here are more standard and do not
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use counting functions.
Multi-Winner Approval Voting (AV). In AV each candidate c ∈ C obtains one
point from each voter who approves of c. The AV-score of a committee W is the total
number of points awarded to members ofW , i.e.,
∑
v∈V |A(v)∩W |. Multi-Winner Ap-
proval Voting considered as an ABC ranking rule ranks committees according to their
score; AV considered as an ABC choice rule outputs all committees with maximum
AV-scores.
Thiele Methods. In 1895, Thiele (1895) proposed a number of ABC ranking rules that
can be viewed as generalizations of Multi-Winner Approval Voting. Consider a se-
quence of weights w = (w1, w2, . . .) and define the w-score of a committee W as∑
v∈V
∑|W∩A(v)|
j=1 wj, i.e., if voter v has x approved candidates in W , W receives a
score of w1 +w2 + · · ·+wx from v. The committees with highest w-score are the win-
ners according to the w-Thiele method. Thiele methods can also be viewed as ABC
ranking rules, where committees are ranked according to their score.
Thiele methods form a remarkably general class of multi-winner rules: apart from
Multi-Winner AV which is defined by the weights wAV = (1, 1, 1, . . .), PAV and CC also
fall into this class. Thiele methods are also a general class in the sense that they contain
both polynomial-time computable rules (such as AV) and NP-hard rules (such as PAV or
CC) (Skowron et al., 2016; Aziz et al., 2015).
Proportional Approval Voting (PAV). PAV was first proposed by Thiele (1895); it
was later reinvented by Simmons (2010), who introduced the name “proportional ap-
proval voting”. PAV is a Thiele method defined by the weights w = (1, 1/2, 1/3, . . . ).
These weights being harmonic numbers guarantee proportionality—in contrast to Multi-
Winner Approval Voting, which is not a proportional method. The Proportionality of
PAV is illustrated in the example in Introduction.
Approval Chamberlin–Courant (CC). Also the Approval Chamberlin–Courant rule
was suggested and recommended by Thiele (1895). It closely resembles the Chamberlin–
Courant (1983) rule, which was originally defined for ordinal preferences but can easily
be adapted to the approval setting. The Approval Chamberlin–Courant rule is a Thiele
method defined by the weights wCC = (1, 0, 0, . . . ). Consequently, CC chooses commit-
tees so as to maximize the number of voters who have at least one approved candidate
in the winning committee.
3 ABC Counting Rules
In this section we define a new class of multi-winner rules, called ABC counting rules.
ABC counting rules can be viewed as an adaptation of positional scoring rules (Smith,
1973; Young, 1974a) to the world of approval-based multi-winner rules. Furthermore,
ABC counting rules can be viewed as analogous to the class of (multi-winner) committee
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scoring rules as introduced by Elkind et al. (2017) but defined for approval ballots instead
of ranked ballots.
After formally defining ABC counting rules and introducing some basic axioms, we
will present our main technical result: an axiomatic characterization of the class of ABC
counting rules. This result forms the basis for our subsequent axiomatic analysis.
3.1 Defining ABC Counting Rules
A counting function is a mapping f : [0, k] × [0, m] → R satisfying f(x, y) ≥ f(x′, y) for
x ≥ x′. The intuitive meaning is that f(x, y) denotes the score that a committee W
obtains from a voter that approves of x members of W and y candidates in total. We
define the score of W in A as
scf (W,A) =
∑
v∈V
f(|A(v) ∩W |, |A(v)|). (1)
We say that a counting function f implements an ABC ranking rule F if for every
A ∈ A(C) and W1,W2 ∈ Pk(C),
f(W1, A) > f(W2, A) if and only if W1 ≻F(A) W2.
Analogously, we say that a counting function f implements an ABC choice rule F if
for every A ∈ A(C), we have that F(A) = argmaxW∈Pk(C)scf(W,A), i.e., F returns all
committees with maximum score. An ABC (winner) rule F is an ABC counting rule if
there exists a counting function f that implements F .
Several ABC ranking rules that we introduced earlier are ABC counting rules. As we
have seen in the introduction, AV, PAV, and CC can be implemented by the following
counting function:
fAV(x, y) = x, fPAV(x, y) =
x∑
i=1
1/i, fCC(x, y) =
{
0 if x = 0,
1 if x ≥ 1.
Further, ABC counting rules include rules such as Constant Threshold Methods (Fish-
burn and Pekec, 2004) and Satisfaction Approval Voting (Brams and Kilgour, 2014),
implemented by
fCT(x, y) =
{
0 if x < t,
1 if x ≥ t
and fSAV(x, y) =
x
y
.
Note that only Satisfaction Approval Voting is implemented by a counting function de-
pending on y. As can easily be verified, Thiele methods are exactly those ABC counting
rules that can be implemented by a counting function not dependent on y.
It is apparent that not the whole domain of a counting rule is relevant; consider for
example f(2, 1) or f(0, m)—these function values will not be used in the score computation
of any committee, cf. Equation (1). The following proposition provides a tool for showing
that two counting rules are equivalent. It shows which part of the domain of counting
rules is relevant and that affine transformations yield equivalent rules.
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Proposition 1. Let Dm,k = {(x, y) ∈ [0, k] × [0, m − 1] : x ≤ y ∧ k − x ≤ m − y} and
let f, g be counting functions. If there exist c ∈ R and d : [m] → R such that f(x, y) =
c · g(x, y) + d(y) for all x, y ∈ Dm,k then f, g implement the same ABC counting rule,
i.e., for all approval profiles A ∈ A(C, V ) and committees W1,W2 ∈ Pk(C) it holds that
W1 ≻f(A) W2 if and only if W1 ≻g(A) W2.
3.2 Basic Axioms
In this section, we discuss formal definitions of the axioms used for our main charac-
terization result (Theorem 1). All axioms are natural and straightforward adaptations
of the respective properties of single-winner election rules and will be stated for ABC
ranking rules. In Appendix D, where we extend some of our results to ABC choice rules,
we explain how these axioms should be formulated for ABC choice rules. Similar ax-
ioms have also been considered in the context of multi-winner rules based on linear-order
preferences (Elkind et al., 2017; Skowron et al., 2019).
Anonymity and neutrality enforce perhaps the most basic fairness requirements for
voting rules. Anonymity is a property which requires that all voters are treated equally,
i.e., the result of an election does not depend on particular names of voters but only on
votes that have been cast. In other words, under anonymous ABC ranking rules, each
voter has the same voting power. Neutrality is similar, but enforces equal treatment of
candidates rather than of voters.
Anonymity. An ABC ranking rule F is anonymous if for V, V ′ ⊂ N such that
|V | = |V ′|, for each bijection ρ : V → V ′, and for A ∈ A(C, V ) and A′ ∈ A(C, V ′)
such that A(v) = A′(ρ(v)) for each v ∈ V , it holds that F(A) = F(A′).
Neutrality. An ABC ranking rule F is neutral if for each bijection σ : C → C and
A,A′ ∈ A(C, V ) with σ(A) = A′ it holds for W1,W2 ∈ Pk(C) that W1 F(A) W2 if
and only if σ(W1) F(A′) σ(W2).
Due to their analogous structure and similar interpretations, anonymity and neutrality
are very often considered together, and jointly referred to as symmetry.
Symmetry. An ABC ranking rule is symmetric if it is anonymous and neutral.
Consistency was first introduced in the context of single-winner rules by Smith (1973)
and then adapted by Young (1974a). In the world of single-winner rules, consistency
is often considered to be the axiom that characterizes positional scoring rules. Simi-
larly, consistency played a crucial role in the recent characterization of committee scoring
rules (Skowron et al., 2019), which can be considered the equivalent of positional scoring
rules in the multi-winner setting. Consistency is also the main ingredient for our axiomatic
characterization of ABC counting rules.
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Consistency. An ABC ranking rule F is consistent if for A,A′ ∈ A(C), and
W1,W2 ∈ Pk(C),
(i) if W1 ≻F(A) W2 and W1 F(A′) W2, then W1 ≻F(A+A′) W2, and
(ii) if W1 F(A) W2 and W1 F(A′) W2, then W1 F(A+A′) W2.
Next, we describe efficiency, which captures the intuition that voters prefer to have
more approved candidates in the committee.
Efficiency. An ABC ranking rule F satisfies efficiency if for W1,W2 ∈ Pk(C) and
A ∈ A(C, V ) where for every voter v ∈ V we have |A(v)∩W1| ≥ |A(v)∩W2|, it holds
that W1 F(A) W2.
For k = 1, i.e., in the single-winner setting, efficiency is the well-known Pareto effi-
ciency axiom, which requires that if a candidate c is unanimously preferred to candidate
d, then d  c in the collective ranking (Moulin, 1988).
For the purpose of our axiomatic characterization, a significantly weaker form of ef-
ficiency suffices. Weak efficiency only requires that candidates that are approved by no
voter are at most as desirable as any other candidate.
Weak efficiency. An ABC ranking rule F satisfies weak efficiency if for each
W1,W2 ∈ Pk(C) and A ∈ A(C, V ) where no voter approves a candidate in W2 \W1,
it holds that W1 F(A) W2.
If we consider the single-winner case here, we see that the axiom reduces to the fol-
lowing statement: if no voter approves candidate d, then any other candidate is at least
as preferable as d.
The following lemma shows that efficiency in the context of neutral and consistent
rules is implied by its weaker counterpart.
Lemma 1. A neutral, consistent and weak efficient ABC ranking rule satisfies efficiency.
The final axiom, continuity (Young, 1975) (also known in the literature as the Archimedean
property (Smith, 1973) or the Overwhelming Majority axiom (Myerson, 1995)), describes
the influence of large majorities in the process of making a decision. Continuity en-
forces that a large enough group of voters is able to force the election of their most pre-
ferred committee. Continuity is pivotal in Young’s characterization of positional scoring
rules (Young, 1975) as it excludes specific tie-breaking mechanisms.
Continuity. An ABC ranking rule F satisfies continuity if for eachW1,W2 ∈ Pk(C)
and A,A′ ∈ A(C) where W1 ≻F(A′) W2 there exists a positive integer n such that
W1 ≻F(A+nA′) W2.
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3.3 A Characterization of ABC Counting Rules
The following axiomatic characterization of the generic class of ABC counting rules is a
powerful tool that forms the basis for further characterizations of specific ABC counting
rules. This result resembles Smith’s and Young’s characterization of positional scoring
rules (Young, 1974a; Smith, 1973) as the only social welfare functions satisfying symmetry,
consistency, and continuity. Our characterization additionally requires weak efficiency,
which stems from the condition that a counting function f(x, y) must be weakly increasing
in x. If a similar condition was imposed on positional scoring rules (i.e., that positional
scores are weakly decreasing), an axiom analogous to weak efficiency would be required
for a characterization as well.
Theorem 1. An ABC ranking rule is an ABC counting rule if and only if it satisfies
symmetry, consistency, weak efficiency, and continuity.
It is easy to verify that ABC counting rules satisfy symmetry, consistency, weak ef-
ficiency, and continuity; all this follows immediately from the definitions in Section 3.1.
Proving the other implication, however, requires a long and complex proof, which can
be found in Appendix A. Furthermore, the set of axioms used in Theorem 1 is minimal,
i.e., any subset of axioms is not sufficient for the characterization statement to hold (see
Appendix A.3).
4 Proportional and Disproportional ABC Counting
Rules
In this section we consider axioms describing winning committees in party-list profiles and
that capture a specific variant of proportionality, individual excellence, or diversity. In
party-list profiles, voters and candidates are grouped into clusters, which can be intuitively
viewed as political parties.
Definition 1. An approval profile is a party-list profile with p parties if the set of voters
can be partitioned into N1, N2, . . . , Np and the set of candidates can be partitioned into
C1, C2, . . . , Cp such that, for each i ∈ [p], every voter in Ni approves exactly Ci.
We will show that axioms for party-list profiles are sufficient to characterize certain
ABC counting rules: PAV, AV, and CC. Using the axiomatic characterization of ABC
counting rules (Theorem 1), we obtain full axiomatic characterizations of these three rules.
Finally, we consider a weaker form of proportionality (lower quota) and show that any
ABC counting rule satisfying lower quota is implemented by a counting function that is
“close” to fPAV, the PAV counting function.
4.1 D’Hondt Proportionality
In party-list profiles, we intuitively expect a proportional committee to contain as many
candidates from a party as is proportional to the number of this party’s supporters. There
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are numerous ways in which this concept can be formalized—different notions of propor-
tionality are expressed through different methods of apportionment (Balinski and Young,
1982; Pukelsheim, 2014). In this paper we consider one of the best known, and perhaps
most commonly used concept of proportionality: D’Hondt proportionality (Balinski and
Young, 1982; Pukelsheim, 2014).
The D’Hondt method is an apportionment method that works in k steps. It starts
with an empty committee W = ∅ and in each step it selects a candidate from a set (party)
Ci with maximal value of
|Ni|
|W∩Ci|+1
; the selected candidate is added to W .
Example 1. Consider an election with four groups of voters, N1, N2, N3, and N4 with car-
dinalities equal to 9, 21, 28, and 42, respectively. Further, there are four groups of candi-
dates C1 = {c1, . . . , c10}, C2 = {c11, . . . , c20}, C3 = {c21, . . . , c30}, and C4 = {c31, . . . , c40}.
Each voter in a group Ni approves exactly of the candidates in Ci. Assume k = 10 and
consider Table 1, which illustrates the ratios used in the D’Hondt method for determining
which candidate should be selected.
N1 N2 N3 N4
|Ni|/1 9 21 28 42
|Ni|/2 4.5 10.5 14 21
|Ni|/3 3 7 13 14
|Ni|/4 2.25 5.25 7 10.5
|Ni|/5 1.8 4.2 5.6 8.4
Table 1: Example for the D’Hondt method
In this example the D’Hondt method
will select a candidate from C4 first, next
a candidate from C3, next from C2 or C4
(their ratios in the third step are equal),
etc. Eventually, in the selected commit-
tee there will be one candidate from C1,
two candidates from C2, three from C3,
and four from C4; the respective ratios are
printed in bold.
An important difference between the
apportionment setting and our setting is that we do not necessarily assume an unre-
stricted number of candidates for each party. As a consequence, a party might deserve
additional candidates but this is impossible to fulfill. Taking this restriction into account,
we see that if the D’Hondt method picks a candidate from Ci and adds it to W , then, for
all j, either |Ni|
|W∩Ci|
≥ |Nj |
|W∩Cj |+1
or Cj ⊆ W , i.e., all candidates from party j are already
in the committee. Note that if Cj \ W 6= ∅ and
|Ni|
|W∩Ci|
<
|Nj |
|W∩Cj |+1
, then the D’Hondt
method in the previous step would rather select a candidate from Cj than from Ci. These
observations allow us to give a precise definition of D’Hondt proportional committees.
Definition 2. Let A be a party-list profile with p parties. A committee W ∈ Pk(C)
is D’Hondt proportional for A if for all i, j ∈ [p] one of the following conditions holds:
(i) Cj ⊆ W , or (ii) W ∩ Ci = ∅, or (iii)
|Ni|
|W∩Ci|
≥
|Nj |
|W∩Cj |+1
.
D’Hondt proportionality. An ABC ranking rule satisfies D’Hondt proportionality
if for each party-list profile A ∈ A(C, V ), W ∈ Pk(C) is a winning committee if and
only if W is D’Hondt proportional for A (see Definition 2).
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Note that this axiom is weak in the sense that it only describes the expected behavior
of an ABC ranking rule on party-list profiles. As we will see, however, it is sufficient
to obtain an axiomatic characterization of PAV in the more general framework of ABC
ranking rules.
Theorem 2. Proportional Approval Voting is the only ABC counting rule that satisfies
D’Hondt proportionality.
Proof. To see that PAV satisfies D’Hondt proportionality, let fPAV be the PAV counting
function defined by fPAV(x, y) =
∑x
i=1
1/i. Consider a party-list profile A with p parties,
i.e., we have a partition of voters N1, N2, . . . Np and their corresponding joint approval
sets C1, . . . , Cp. For the sake of contradiction let us assume that W ∈ Pk(C) is a winning
committee and that there exists i, j such that |Ni|
|W∩Ci|
<
|Nj |
|W∩Cj |+1
,W ∩Ci 6= ∅ and Cj \W 6=
∅. Let a ∈ W ∩ Ci and b ∈ Cj \W . We define W
′ = W ∪ {b} \ {a}. Let us compute the
difference between PAV-scores of W and W ′:
scfPAV(W
′, A)− scfPAV(W,A) =
−|Ni|
|W ∩ Ci|
+
|Nj |
|W ∩ Cj|+ 1
> 0.
Thus, we see that W ′ has a higher PAV-score than W , a contradiction.
To show the other direction, let F be an ABC ranking rule satisfying all the above
axioms. By Lemma 2, F also satisfies weak efficiency. Now Theorem 1 implies that F is
an ABC counting rule. Let f be the corresponding counting function. We intend to apply
Proposition 1 to show that f is equivalent to the PAV counting function fPAV(x, y) =∑x
i=1
1/i. Hence we have to show that there exists a constant c and a function d : [m]→ R
such that f(x) = c · fPAV(x, y) + d(y) for all (x, y) ∈ Dm,k = {(x, y) ∈ [0, k]× [0, m− 1] :
x ≤ y ∧ k − x ≤ m− y}. W.l.o.g., we can focus on the case when k < m.
We first consider the case when k − x < m − y and x ≥ 1. Now, let us fix x, y ∈ N
such that 1 ≤ x ≤ k, x ≤ y ≤ m, and k − x < m − y. Let us consider the following
party-list profile. There are three groups of voters: N1, N2, N3 with |N1| = 1, |N2| = x and
|N3| = (k − x); their corresponding approval sets are C1, C2, C3. Let |C1| = 1, |C2| = y,
and |C3| = m − y − 1 ≥ k − x. Consider the two following committees: we choose W1
such that |W1∩C1| = 1, |W1∩C2| = x−1, and |W1∩C3| = k−x; we chose W2 such that
|W2 ∩C1| = 0, |W2 ∩C2| = x, and |W2 ∩C3| = k− x. It is straight-forward to verify that
both W1 and W2 are D’Hondt proportional. Thus, W1 and W2 are winning committees
and hence have the same scores. Their respective scores are
scf(W1, A) = |N1| · f(|W1 ∩ C1|, |C1|) + |N2| · f(|W1 ∩ C2|, |C2|) + |N3| · f(|W1 ∩ C3|, |C3|)
= f(1, 1) + xf(x− 1, y) + (k − x)f(k − x,m− y − 1),
scf(W2, A) = |N1| · f(0, |C1|) + |N2| · f(|W2 ∩ C2|, |C2|) + |N3| · f(|W2 ∩ C3|, |C3|)
= f(0, 1) + xf(x, y) + (k − x)f(k − x,m− y − 1).
Since scf(W1, A) = scf (W2, A) we have
f(x, y) = f(x− 1, y) +
1
x
(
f(1, 1)− f(0, 1)
)
.
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As we show this statement for 1 ≤ x ≤ k and x ≤ y ≤ m, we can expand this equation
and obtain
f(x, y) = f(0, y) +
(
f(1, 1)− f(0, 1)
) x∑
i=1
1
i
.
Obviously, the above equality also holds for x = 0.
Now, we move to the case when k− x = m− y and x ≥ 0. Since m > k, we have that
y ≥ x+ 1. Consider the party-list profile with k− x+ 1 parties with |N1| = x(x+1) and
|Ni| = x, for 2 ≤ i ≤ k−x+1; the corresponding candidate sets are |C1| = y and |Ci| = 1
for i ≥ 2. Note that |C1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ck−x+1| = k − x + y = m. Consider the two following
committees of size k: W1 consists of x candidates from C1, and a single candidate from
Ci for each 2 ≤ i ≤ k − x + 1; W2 consists of x + 1 candidates from C1, and a single
candidate from each Ci, 3 ≤ i ≤ k − x+ 1.
Similar to before, it can be shown that both W1 and W2 are D’Hondt proportional
and hence scf (W1, A) = scf (W2, A). The PAV-scores of W1 and W2 are
scf(W1, A) = x(x+ 1)f(x, y) + x(k − x)f(1, 1),
scf(W2, A) = x(x+ 1)f(x+ 1, y) + x(k − x− 1)f(1, 1) + xf(0, 1).
Thus,
f(x+ 1, y) = f(x, y) +
f(1, 1)− f(0, 1)
x+ 1
= f(0, y) +
(
f(1, 1)− f(0, 1)
) x+1∑
i=1
1
i
.
We conclude that for (x, y) ∈ Dm,k we have
f(x, y) = f(0, y) +
(
f(1, 1)− f(0, 1)
) x∑
i=1
1
i
.
Hence we have shown that indeed f(x) = c · fPAV(x, y)+ d(y) for c = f(1, 1)− f(0, 1) and
d(y) = f(0, y) and, by Proposition 1, F is PAV.
We can use Theorem 2 to obtain an axiomatic characterization within all ABC ranking
rules.
Lemma 2. An ABC ranking rule that satisfies neutrality, consistency, and D’Hondt pro-
portionality also satisfies weak efficiency.
By combining Theorems 1, 2, and Lemma 2, we obtain the desired characterization.
Corollary 1. Proportional Approval Voting is the only ABC ranking rule that satisfies
symmetry, consistency, continuity, and D’Hondt proportionality.
The characterization of Corollary 1 also holds for ABC choice rules, i.e., for approval-
based multi-winner rules returning a set of winning committees. Some of the axioms have
to be slightly adapted to be suitable for ABC choice rules, e.g., consistency can only
distinguish between winning and losing committees. We refer the reader to Appendix D
for precise descriptions of the relevant axioms and a proof of Theorem 2 (and Corollary 1)
for ABC choice rules.
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4.2 Disjoint Equality
In some scenarios we might not want a multi-winner rule to be proportional. For example,
if our goal is to select a set of finalists in a contest based on a set of recommendations
coming from judges or reviewers (a scenario that is often referred to as a shortlisting),
candidates can be assessed independently and there is no need for proportionality. For
instance, if our goal is to select 5 finalists in a contest, and if four reviewers support
candidates c1, . . . , c5 and one reviewer supports candidates c6, . . . , c10 then it is very likely
that we would prefer to select candidates c1, . . . , c5 as the finalists—in contrast to what,
e.g., D’Hondt proportionality suggests.
Disjoint equality is a property which might be viewed as a certain type of dispro-
portionality. Intuitively, it requires that each approval of a candidate carries the same
power: a candidate approved by a voter v receives a certain level of support from v which
does not depend on what other candidates v approves or disapproves of; in particular it
does not depend on whether there are other members of a winning committee which are
approved by v. Disjoint equality was first proposed by Fishburn (1978) and then used
by Sertel (1988) as one of the distinctive axioms characterizing single-winner Approval
Voting. The following axiom is its natural extension to the multi-winner setting.
Disjoint equality. An ABC ranking rule F satisfies disjoint equality if for every
profile A ∈ A(C, V ) with
∣∣⋃
v∈V A(v)
∣∣ ≥ k and where each candidate is approved at
most once, the following holds: W ∈ Pk(C) is a winning committee if and only if
W ⊆
⋃
v∈V A(v).
In other words, disjoint equality asserts that in a profile consisting of disjoint approval
ballots every committee wins that consists of approved candidates. Note that disjoint
equality applies to an even more restricted form of party-list profiles.
Theorem 3. Multi-Winner Approval Voting is the only ABC counting rule that satisfies
disjoint equality.
Proof. It is straightforward to verify that Multi-Winner Approval Voting satisfies dis-
joint equality. For the other direction, consider an ABC counting rule satisfying disjoint
equality that is implemented by a counting function f . As in previous proofs we rely
on Proposition 1 to show that f and fAV(x, y) = x implement the same ABC counting
rule. It is thus our aim to show that for (x, y) ∈ Dm,k it holds that f(x, y) = c · x+ d(y)
for some c ∈ R and d : [m] → R. More specifically, we will show that for (x, y) ∈ Dm,k
with 0 ≤ x < y it holds that f(x + 1, y) − f(x, y) = f(1, 1) − f(0, 1). It then follows
from induction that f(x, y) = (f(1, 0)− f(0, 0)) · x+ f(0, y) and thus we will be able to
conclude that f implements Multi-Winner Approval Voting.
Let (x, y) ∈ Dm,k with x < k and x < y. We construct a profile A ∈ A(C, [k− x+ 1])
with |A(1)| = y and |A(2)| = · · · = |A(k − x + 1)| = 1. All voters have disjoint sets
of approved candidates. Hence this construction requires y + k − x candidates. Since
(x, y) ∈ Dm,k, it holds that k − x ≤ m − y and hence y + k − x ≤ m; we see that a
sufficient number of candidates is available. Let W1 contain x candidates from A(1) and
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one candidate from A(2), . . . , A(k − x + 1) each. Let W2 contain x + 1 candidates from
A(1) and one candidate from A(2), . . . , A(k − x) each. Note that |W1| = |W2| = k. By
disjoint equality both W1 and W2 are winning committees. Hence
f(x, y) + (k − x) · f(1, 1) = f(x+ 1, y) + (k − x− 1) · f(1, 1) + f(0, 1)
and thus f(x+ 1, y)− f(x, y) = f(1, 1)− f(0, 1).
Similarly to Corollary 1, also Theorem 3 together with Theorem 1 yield an axiomatic
characterization: AV is the only ABC ranking rule that satisfies symmetry, consistency,
weak efficiency, continuity, and disjoint equality.
It is noteworthy that the disjoint equality axiom applies to approval profiles with an
arbitrary number of voters. This is in contrast to the original disjoint equality axiom,
which has been used to axiomatically characterize single-winner Approval Voting (Fish-
burn, 1978): in this setting it sufficed to consider profiles with two voters. This is not the
case in the multi-winner setting, as we show in Appendix C.
4.3 Disjoint Diversity
The disjoint diversity axiom is strongly related to the diversity principle, as it states that
there exists a winning committee in which the k strongest parties receive at least one
seat—without consideration of their actual proportions.
Disjoint diversity. An ABC ranking rule F satisfies disjoint diversity if for every
party-list profile A ∈ A(C, V ) with p parties and |N1| ≥ |N1| ≥ · · · ≥ |Np|, there
exists a winning committee W with W ∩ Ci 6= ∅ for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,min(p, k)}.
Note that disjoint diversity is a slightly weaker axiom in comparison to D’Hondt
proportionality and disjoint equality since it does not characterize all winning committees
for party-list profiles—it only guarantees the existence of one specific winning committee.
Theorem 4. The Approval Chamberlin–Courant rule is the only non-trivial ABC count-
ing rule that satisfies disjoint diversity.
Proof. The Approval Chamberlin–Courant rule maximizes the number of voters that have
at least one approved candidate in the committee. In a party-list profile, this implies that
the k largest parties receive at least one representative in the committee and hence disjoint
diversity is satisfied.
For the other direction, let F be an ABC counting rule implemented by a counting
function f . Recall Proposition 1 and the relevant domain of counting functions Dm,k =
{(x, y) ∈ [0, k] × [0, m − 1] : x ≤ y ∧ k − x ≤ m − y}. In a first step, we want to show
that f(x + 1, y) = f(x, y) for x ≥ 1 and (x + 1, y), (x, y) ∈ Dm,k. Let us fix (x, y) such
that (x, y) ∈ Dm,k, (x + 1, y) ∈ Dm,k, and x ≥ 1. Furthermore, let us fix a committee
W and consider a set X ⊆ C with |X| = y and |X ∩W | = x. We construct a party-list
profile A as follows: A contains ζ votes that approve X (intuitively, ζ is a large natural
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number); further for each candidate c ∈ W \ X , profile A contains a single voter who
approves {c}. This construction requires y + (k − x) candidates. Since (x, y) ∈ Dm,k, we
have y + (k − x) ≤ m.
If we apply disjoint diversity to profile A, we obtain a winning committee W ′ with
W \ X ⊆ W ′ and |W ′ ∩ X| ≥ 1. By efficiency (which holds due to Lemma 1), W is
winning as well. Let W ′′ be the committee we obtain from W by replacing one candidate
in W \X with a candidate in X \W (such a candidate exists since (x+1, y) ∈ Dm,k). By
disjoint diversity W ′′ is not a winning committee. Consequently, scf (W
′′, A) < scf(W,A)
and thus
ζf(x+ 1, y) + (k − x− 1)f(1, 1) < ζf(x, y) + (k − x)f(1, 1). (2)
The above condition can be written as f(x+1, y)−f(x, y) < 1
ζ
·f(1, 1). Since this must hold
for any ζ , we get that f(x+ 1, y) ≤ f(x, y). Efficiency implies that f(x+ 1, y) ≥ f(x, y);
thus we get that f(x+ 1, y) = f(x, y) for x ≥ 1. By Proposition 1 we can set f(0, y) = 0
for each y ∈ [m]. We conclude that F is also implemented by the counting function
fα(x, y) =
{
0 if x = 0,
α(y) if x ≥ 1.
As a next step we show that for the counting function fα(x, y) we can additionally
assume that α(y) = α(1), for each y. Observe that if y ≥ m − k + 1, then for each
committee W , a voter who approves y candidates in total, approves at least one member
of W . By our previous reasoning, each committee gets from such a voter the same score,
and so such a voter does not influence the outcome of an election. Consequently, we
can assume that α(y) = α(1) for y > m − k. Now, for y ≤ m − k, we also show that
α(y) = α(1). Towards a contradiction assume that α(y) 6= α(1) and further, without
loss of generality, α(y) > α(1). To this end, let n be natural number large enough so
that (n − 1) · α(y) > n · α(1). Consider a party-list profile consisting of n − 1 voters
approving {c1, . . . , cy}, and, for j ∈ [k], n voters each that approves candidate {cy+j}.
The committee W1 = {cy+1, . . . , cy+k} obtains a score of nk · f(1, 1) = nk · α(1), whereas
W2 = {c1, cy+2, . . . , cy+k} obtains a score of (n−1) ·α(y)+n(k−1) ·α(1). Since by choice
of n it holds that (n − 1) · α(y) > n · α(1), committee W2 is winning. This contradicts
disjoint diversity and hence α(y) = α(1).
Finally, we use Proposition 1 to argue that the CC counting function fCC implements
F . We distinguish two cases: α(1) > 0 and α(1) = 0. If α(1) > 0, then fCC =
1
α(1)
·fα(x, y),
and we see that Proposition 1 indeed applies.
If α(1) = 0, then fα is equivalent (by Proposition 1) to the trivial counting function
f0(x, y) = 0. Since F is non-trivial, this case cannot occur.
As before, we obtain as a corollary that CC is characterized as the only non-trivial
ABC ranking rule that satisfies symmetry, consistency, weak efficiency, continuity, and
disjoint diversity. This characterization also holds for ABC choice rules, see Appendix D
for details.
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4.4 Lower Quota
D’Hondt proportionality determines for every party-list profile an apportionment of candi-
dates to parties. One may wonder if using a weaker definition of proportionality could lead
to other interesting ABC counting rules that are—at least to some degree—proportional.
A natural candidate for a weak notion of proportionality is the lower quota axiom. In-
tuitively, it states that a party that receives an α proportion of votes should receive at
least ⌊α · k⌋ of the k available seats. The D’Hondt method satisfies the lower quota
axiom (Balinski and Young, 1982) and, by that, also PAV does.
Lower Quota. An ABC ranking rule satisfies lower quota if for each party-list
profile A, and a winning committee W ∈ Pk(C) it holds that |W ∩ Ci| ≥
⌊
k|Ni|
|V |
⌋
or
|Ci| <
⌊
k|Ni|
|V |
⌋
.
First, let us observe that there exist ABC counting rules—other than PAV—which
satisfy lower quota.
Example 2. Let m = 3 and k = 2. Let us consider an ABC counting rule defined by
the counting function f(0, y) = 0, and f(1, y) = 1 and f(2, y) = 1.1. This rule satisfies
lower quota: Let A be a party-list profile for m = 3 with p ≤ 3 disjoint groups of voters
N1, N2, . . . Np and with their corresponding approval sets being C1, . . . , Cp. For the sake of
contradiction, let us assume that there exists a winning committee W such that for some
i ∈ [p] we have |Ci| ≥
⌊
2 · |Ni|
|V |
⌋
and |W ∩ Ci| <
⌊
2 · |Ni|
|V |
⌋
. If Ni = V , then this means
that a candidate who is not approved by any voter is contained in W , which contradicts
the definition of our rule and the fact that there exist two candidates approved by some
voters (since |Ni| = |V |, we get that |Ci| ≥ 2). If |Ni| < |V |, then
⌊
2 · |Ni|
|V |
⌋
can either
be 0 or 1. Since |W ∩ Ci| <
⌊
2 · |Ni|
|V |
⌋
, we conclude that
⌊
2 · |Ni|
|V |
⌋
= 1 and |W ∩ Ci| = 0.
Consequently |Ni| ≥
|V |
2
; even if all the remaining voters from V \ Ni approved the two
members of the winning committee W it is more beneficial, according to our rule, to drop
one such candidate from W and to add a candidate from Ci. Indeed, it is easy to verify
that such a committee would have a higher score. This shows that our rule indeed satisfies
lower quota.
The following shows that ABC counting rules satisfying lower quota must resemble
PAV.
Proposition 2. Fix x, y ∈ N and let m ≥ y+ k− x+1. Let F be an ABC counting rule
satisfying lower quota, and let f be a counting function implementing F . It holds that:
f(x− 1, y) +
1
x
· f(1, 1) ·
k − x
k − x+ 1
≤ f(x, y) ≤ f(x− 1, y) +
1
x− 1
· f(1, 1).
Note that limk→∞
k−x
k−x+1
= 1, so Proposition 2 asserts that—for large k—the value of
f(x, y) is roughly between f(x−1, y)+ 1
x
·f(1, 1) and f(x−1, y)+ 1
x−1
·f(1, 1). Recall that
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for PAV we have that f(x, y) = f(x − 1, y) + 1
x
· f(1, 1) and hence Proposition 2 indeed
implies that an ABC counting rule satisfying lower quota must be defined by a counting
function similar to PAV.
For a visualization of this result we recall Figure 1 in the introduction of this pa-
per. The gray area displays the lower and upper bound obtained from Proposition 2; to
compute a lower bound we used k = 8.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we analyzed a variety of different rules which all satisfy four common prop-
erties: symmetry, consistency, continuity, and weak efficiency. We identified the class
of rules that is uniquely defined by these four properties: ABC counting rules. The in-
tuitive relevance of these four axioms is quite different: we believe that if symmetry is
accepted as a prerequisite for a sensible voting rule, consistency is the essential axiom for
the characterization of ABC counting rules. It can be expected that weak efficiency only
guarantees that the score of a fixed voter is non-decreasing if more approved candidates
are in the committee. It is a plausible assumption that voters desire to have approved
candidates in the committee and hence weak efficiency only rules out pathological exam-
ples of multi-winner rules. The role of continuity is also a technical one. We conjecture
that the role of continuity in our characterization is the same as the role of continuity
in (single-winner) positional scoring rules, i.e., removing continuity also allows for ABC
counting rules that use other ABC counting rules to break ties. These arguments support
our claim that ABC counting rules capture essentially the class of consistent approval-
based multi-winner rules. A formal characterization of ABC ranking rules that satisfy
symmetry and consistency would be desirable to substantiate this claim and to further
shed light on consistent rules.
The class of ABC counting rules is remarkably broad and includes rules such as Pro-
portional Approval Voting, Approval Chamberlin–Courant and Multi-Winner Approval
Voting, for all of which we have provided an axiomatic characterization. These charac-
terizations are obtained by axioms that describe desirable outcomes for certain simple
profiles, in particular for party-list profiles. This is a fruitful approach as it is much easier
to formally define concepts such as proportionality or diversity on these simple profiles.
In such profiles it is also easy to formulate properties which quantify trade-offs between
efficiency, proportionality, and diversity. Furthermore, the simpler domain of party-list
profiles is sufficient to explain the difference between the rules: PAV, AV, and CC can be
obtained by extending three different principles defined for party-list profiles to the more
general domain by additionally imposing the same set of axioms. Therefore, their defining
differences can be found in party-list profiles. Our results are general and can easily be ex-
tended to other concepts definable on party-list profiles, e.g., Sainte-Lague¨ (Pukelsheim,
2014; Balinski and Young, 1982) or square-root proportionality (Penrose, 1946; Slom-
czyn´ski and Z˙yczkowski, 2006). Square-root proportionality follows the degressive pro-
portionality principle (Koriyama et al., 2013), which suggests that smaller populations
should be allocated more representatives than linear proportionality would require. This
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can be achieved by using a flatter counting function than fPAV and by that we obtain
rules which increasingly promote diversity within the committee. An extreme example is
the Approval Chamberlin–Courant rule, where the diversity within a winning committee
is strongly favored over proportionality. On the other hand, using steeper counting func-
tions results in rules where we care more about individual excellence, i.e., about selecting
candidates with the high total support from voters, than about having proportionality
of representation. Multi-Winner Approval Voting is an extreme example of a rule which
does not guarantee virtually any level of proportionality.
We would like to conclude this paper with possible directions for future research.
Apart from a deeper analysis of consistent multi-winner rules, it would be of particular
interest to achieve a better understanding of rules that do not satisfy the consistency
axiom. Examples include Single Transferable Vote (STV), Monroe’s rule (Monroe, 1995)
(in both the approval-based and ranking-based setting), Minimax Approval Voting (Brams
et al., 2007), and rules invented by Phragme´n (Phragme´n, 1894; Brill et al., 2017). It is
noteworthy that Phragme´n’s sequential rule satisfies D’Hondt proportionality and by that
shares a key property of PAV. The same holds for the Sequential PAV rule (Kilgour, 2010):
an axiomatic characterization of this rule is of great interest.
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A Axiomatic Characterization of ABC Counting Rules
In this section we prove the main technical result of this paper:
Theorem 1. An ABC ranking rule is an ABC counting rule if and only if it satisfies
symmetry, consistency, weak efficiency, and continuity.
The following definitions and notation will prove useful:
• For each ℓ ∈ [0, m], we say that an approval profile A is ℓ-regular if each voter in A
approves of exactly ℓ candidates.
• We say that A is ℓ-bounded if each voter in A approves of at most ℓ candidates.
• We write set(A) to denote {A(v) : v ∈ V } and by that ignore multiplicities of votes.
• Sometimes we associate an approval set S ⊆ C with the single-voter profile A ∈
A(C, {1}) such that A(1) = S; in such a case we write F(S) as a short form of F(A)
for appropriately defined A.
Committee scoring rules. Before we start describing our construction, let us recall
the definition of committee scoring rules (Skowron et al., 2019), a concept that will play an
instrumental role in our further discussion. Linear order-based committee (LOC) ranking
rules, in contrast to ABC ranking rules, assume that voters’ preferences are given as
linear orders over the set of candidates. For a finite set of voters V = {v1, . . . , vn} ⊂ N,
a profile of linear orders over V , P = (P (v1), . . . , P (vn)), is an n-tuple of linear orders
over C indexed by the elements of V , i.e., for all v ∈ V we have P (v) ∈ L (C). A linear
order-based committee ranking rule (LOC ranking rule) is a function that maps profiles
of linear orders to W (Pk(C)), the set of weak orders over committees.
Let P be a profile of linear orders over V . For a vote v and a candidate a, by
posv(a, P ) we denote the position of a in P (v) (the top-ranked candidate has position 1
and the bottom-ranked candidate has position m). For a vote v ∈ V and a committee
W ∈ Pk(C), we write posv(W,P ) to denote the set of positions of all members of W in
ranking P (v), i.e., posv(W,P ) = {posv(a, P ) : a ∈ W}. A committee scoring function is
a mapping g : Pk([m])→ R that for each possible position that a committee can occupy
in a ranking (there are
(
m
k
)
of all possible positions), assigns a score. Intuitively, for each
I ∈ Pk([m]) value g(I) can be viewed as the score assigned by a voter v to the committee
whose members stand in v’s ranking on positions from set I. Additionally, a committee
scoring function g(I) is required to satisfy weak dominance, which is defined as follows.
Let I, J ∈ Pk([m]) such that I = {i1, . . . , ik}, J = {j1, . . . , jk}, and that i1 < · · · < ik
and j1 < · · · < jk. We say that I dominates J if for each t ∈ [k] we have it ≤ jt. Weak
dominance holds if I dominating J implies that g(I) ≥ g(J).
For a profile of linear orders P over C and a committeeW ∈ Pk(C), we write scf (W,P )
to denote the total score that the voters from V assign to committee W . Formally, we
have that scg(W,P ) =
∑
v∈V g(posv(W,P )). An LOC ranking rule G is an LOC scoring
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rule if there exists a committee scoring function g such that for each W1,W2 ∈ Pk(C)
and profile of linear orders P over V , we have that W1 is strictly preferred to W2 with
respect to the weak order G(P ) if and only if scg(W1, P ) > scg(W2, P ).
The axioms from Section 3.2 can be naturally formulated for LOC ranking rules. We
will use these formulations of the axioms in the proof of Lemma 3. For the sake of
readability we do not recall their definitions here, but rather in the proof, where they are
used.
Overview of the proof of Theorem 1. As mentioned before, it is easy to see that
ABC counting rules satisfy symmetry, consistency, weak efficiency, and continuity. The
proof of the other direction consists of several steps.
In Section A.1, we prove that the characterization theorem holds for the very restricted
class of ℓ-regular profiles, i.e., profiles where every voter approves exactly ℓ candidates.
To this end, we construct a collection of LOC rules {Gℓ}ℓ=1...m based on how F operates
on ℓ-regular profiles. We then show that the LOC ranking rule Gℓ satisfies equivalent
axioms to symmetry, consistency, weak efficiency, and continuity. This allows us to apply
a theorem by Skowron, Faliszewski, and Slinko (Skowron et al., 2019), who proved that
LOC ranking rules satisfying these axioms are in fact LOC scoring rules. Thus, there
exists a corresponding committee scoring function gℓ, which in turn defines a counting
function fℓ. As a last step, we show that fℓ implements F on ℓ-regular approval profiles
and thus prove that Theorem 3 holds restricted to ℓ-regular approval profiles.
In Section A.2, we extend this restricted result to arbitrary approval profiles. For each
ℓ ∈ [m] we have obtained a counting function fℓ which defines F on ℓ-regular profiles.
Our goal is to show that there exists a linear combination of these counting functions
f =
∑
ℓ∈[m] γℓfℓ which defines F on arbitrary profiles. We define the corresponding
coefficients γ1, . . . , γm inductively. We first construct two specific committees W
∗
1 and
W ∗2 , which we use to scale the coefficients, and additionally, in order to define coefficient
γℓ+1 we construct two specific votes, a
∗
ℓ+1 and b
∗
ℓ+1, with exactly ℓ + 1, and at most ℓ
approved candidates, respectively. We define coefficient γℓ+1 using the definition of f
for ℓ-bounded profiles and by exploring how F compares committees W ∗1 and W
∗
2 for
very specific profiles which are build from certain numbers of votes a∗ℓ+1 and b
∗
ℓ+1. This
concludes the construction of f .
Showing that f =
∑
ℓ∈[m] γℓfℓ implements F requires a rather involved analysis, which
is divided into several lemmas. In Lemma 7 we show that f implements F , but only
for the case when F is used to compare W ∗1 and W
∗
2 , and only for very specific profiles.
In Lemma 8 we still assume that F is used to compare only W ∗1 and W
∗
2 , but this time
we extend the statement to arbitrary profiles. In Lemma 10 we show the case when F
is used to compare W ∗1 with any other committee. We complete this reasoning with a
short discussion explaining the validity of our statement in its full generality. Each of the
aforementioned lemmas is based on a different idea and they build upon each other. The
main proof technique is to transform simple approval profiles to more complex ones and
argue that certain properties are preserved due to the required axioms.
ABC ranking rule F
LOC scoring rule Gℓ
committee scoring function gℓ
counting function fℓ
ABC ranking rule F
implements on ℓ-regular
approval profiles
(cf. Lemma 5)
defines (cf. Lemma 4)
implies the existence of (by Skowron et al. (2019))
defines (cf. Lemma 3)
Figure 2: A diagram illustrating the reasoning used in Section A.1 to prove that in ℓ-
regular approval profiles, F is a counting rule.
A.1 F is an ABC Counting Rule on ℓ-Regular Approval Profiles
Recall that we assume that F is an ABC ranking rule satisfying symmetry, consistency,
weak efficiency, and continuity. If F is trivial, i.e., if F always maps to the trivial relation,
then F is the counting rule implemented by f(x, y) = 0. Thus, hereinafter we assume
that F is a fixed, non-trivial ABC ranking rule satisfying anonymity, neutrality, weak
efficiency, and continuity. By Lemma 1 we can also assume that F satisfies efficiency.
As a first step, we will prove in this section that F restricted to ℓ-regular approval
profiles is an ABC counting rule, i.e., that there exists a counting function that implements
F on ℓ-regular approval profiles. For an overview of the argument we refer the reader to
Figure 2.
For each ℓ ∈ [m], from F we construct an LOC ranking rule, Gℓ, as follows. For a
profile of linear orders P , by Appr(P, ℓ) we denote the approval preference profile where
voters approve of their top ℓ candidates. We define for every ℓ ∈ [m] an LOC ranking
rule Gℓ, as:
Gℓ(P ) = F
(
Appr(P, ℓ)
)
. (3)
Lemma 3, below, shows that our construction preserves the axioms under consideration
and consequently that Gℓ is an LOC scoring rule. As mentioned before, this lemma heavily
builds upon a result of Skowron, Faliszewski, and Slinko (Skowron et al., 2019).
Lemma 3. Let F be an ABC ranking rule satisfying symmetry, consistency, efficiency
and continuity. Then for each ℓ ∈ [m], the LOC ranking rule Gℓ defined by Equation (3)
is an LOC scoring rule.
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Proof. The proof of this lemma relies on the main theorem of Skowron, Faliszewski, and
Slinko (Skowron et al., 2019): an LOC ranking rule is a LOC scoring rule if and only if
it satisfies anonymity, neutrality, consistency, committee dominance, and continuity. We
thus have to verify that Gℓ satisfies these axioms. Note that since Gℓ is an LOC ranking
rule, the corresponding axioms differ slightly from the ones introduced in Section 3.2.
Thus, in the following we introduce each of these axioms for LOC ranking rules and prove
that it is satisfied by Gℓ for arbitrary ℓ.
(Anonymity) An LOC ranking rule G satisfies anonymity if for each two sets of voters
V, V ′ ⊆ N such that |V | = |V ′|, for each bijection ρ : V → V ′ and for each two preference
profiles P1 ∈ P(C, V ) and P2 ∈ P(C, V
′) such that P1(v) = P2(ρ(v)) for each v ∈ V , it
holds that G(P1) = G(P2). Let V, V
′, ρ, P1, P2 be defined accordingly. Note that P1(v) =
P2(ρ(v)) implies that Appr(P1, ℓ)(v) = Appr(P2, ℓ)(ρ(v)). Hence, by anonymity of F ,
G(P1) = F
(
Appr(P1, ℓ)
)
= F
(
Appr(P2, ℓ)
)
= G(P2).
(Neutrality) An LOC ranking rule G satisfies neutrality if for each permutation σ of
A and each two preference profiles P1, P2 over the same voter set V with P1 = σ(P2),
it holds that G(P1) = σ(G(P2)). Let P1, P2, V , and σ be defined accordingly. Note that
Appr(P1, ℓ) = σ(Appr(P2, ℓ)). Then, by neutrality of F ,
G(P1) = F
(
Appr(P1, ℓ)
)
= F(σ
(
Appr(P2, ℓ)
)
) = σ(F
(
Appr(P2, ℓ)
)
) = σ(G(P2)).
(Consistency) An LOC ranking rule G satisfies consistency if for each two profiles
P1 and P2 over disjoint sets of voters, V ⊂ N and V
′ ⊂ N, V ∩ V ′ = ∅, and each
two committees W1,W2 ∈ Pk(C), (i) if W1 ≻G(P1) W2 and W1 G(P2) W2, then it
holds that W1 ≻G(P1+P2) W2 and (ii) if W1 G(P1) W2 and W1 G(P2) W2, then it holds
that W1 G(P1+P2) W2. Let P1, P2, V, V
′,W1, and W2 be defined accordingly. Let us
prove (i). IfW1 ≻G(P1) W2, then W1 ≻F(Appr(P1,ℓ)) W2. Analogously, if W1 G(P2) W2, then
W1 F(Appr (P2,ℓ)) W2. By consistency of F , we know that W1 ≻F(Appr (P1,ℓ)+Appr(P2,ℓ))
W2. Clearly, Appr(P1, ℓ) + Appr(P2, ℓ) = Appr(P1 + P2, ℓ). We can conclude that
W1 ≻F(Appr (P1+P2,ℓ)) W2 and hence W1 ≻G(P1+P2) W2. The proof of (ii) is analogous.
(Committee dominance) An LOC ranking rule G satisfies committee dominance if for
each two committees W1,W2 ∈ Pk(C) and each profile P ∈ P(C, V ) where for every vote
v ∈ V , posv(W1) dominates posv(W2), it holds that W1 G(P ) W2. Let W1,W2, and P
be defined accordingly. If posv(W1) dominates posv(W2), then clearly for each v ∈ V ,
|Appr(P, ℓ)(v) ∩W1| ≥ |Appr(P, ℓ)(v) ∩W2|. By efficiency of F , W1 G(P ) W2.
(Continuity) An LOC ranking rule G satisfies continuity if for each two committees
W1,W2 ∈ Pk(C) and each two profiles P1 and P2 where W1 ≻G(P2) W2, there exists a
number n ∈ N such that W1 ≻G(P1+nP2) W2. This is an immediate consequence of the fact
that F satisfies continuity.
Lemma 3 shows that there exists a committee scoring function implementing rule Gℓ.
The following lemma shows that this committee scoring function has a special form that
allows it to be represented by a counting function.
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Lemma 4. For ℓ ∈ [m], let gℓ : Pk([m]) → R be a committee scoring function that
implements Gℓ. There exists a counting function fℓ such that that:
gℓ(I) = fℓ(|{i ∈ I : i ≤ ℓ}|, ℓ) for each I ∈ [m]k and ℓ ∈ [m].
Proof. We have to show that for an arbitrary profile of linear orders P over V and some
v ∈ V , two committees W1 and W2 have the same score gℓ(posv(W1)) = gℓ(posv(W2))
given that
|{i ∈ posv(W1) : i ≤ ℓ}| = |{i ∈ posv(W2) : i ≤ ℓ}|.
From the neutrality of F , we see that if v has the same number of approved members in
W1 as in W2, W1 and W2 are equally good with respect to F . Thus if W1 and W2 have
the same number of members in the top ℓ positions in v, then W1 and W2 are also equally
good with respect to Gℓ. Hence the scores assigned by gℓ to the positions occupied by W1
and W2 are the same.
We are now ready to prove Lemma 5, which provides the main technical conclusion of
this section.
Lemma 5. For each ℓ ∈ [m], the counting function fℓ(a, ℓ), as defined in the statement
of Lemma 4, implements F on ℓ-regular approval profiles.
Proof. For each ℓ-regular approval profile A we can create an ordinal profile Rank(A, ℓ)
where voters put all approved candidates in their top ℓ positions (in some fixed arbitrary
order) and in the next (m − ℓ) positions the candidates that they disapprove of (also
in some fixed arbitrary order). Naturally, Appr(Rank(A, ℓ), ℓ) = A. Thus, a committee
W1 is preferred over W2 in A according to F if and only if W1 is preferred over W2 in
Rank(A, ℓ) according to Gℓ. Since Gℓ is an LOC scoring rule, the previous statement
holds if and only if W1 has a higher score than W2 according to the committee scoring
function gℓ. This is equivalent to W1 having a higher score according to fℓ (Lemma 4).
We conclude thatW1 is preferred over W2 in A according to F if and onlyW1 has a higher
score according to fℓ. Consequently, we have shown that F is an ABC counting rule for
ℓ-regular approval profiles.
As the construction in the proof of Lemma 5 relies on Rank(A, ℓ) and so it applies
only to profiles where each voter approves the same number of candidates, we need new
ideas to prove that F is an ABC counting rule on arbitrary profiles. We explain these
ideas in the following section.
A.2 F is an ABC Counting Rule on Arbitrary Profiles
We now generalize the result of Lemma 5 for ℓ-regular profiles to arbitrary approval
profiles. We will use here the following notation.
Definition 3. For an approval profile A ∈ A(C, V ) and x ∈ [0, m] we write Bnd(A, ℓ) to
denote the profile consisting of all votes v ∈ V with A(v) ≤ ℓ, i.e., Bnd(A, ℓ) ∈ A(C, V ′)
with V ′ = {v ∈ V : A(v) ≤ ℓ} and Bnd(A, ℓ)(v) = A(v) for all v ∈ V ′. Analogously, we
write Reg(A, ℓ) to denote the profile consisting of all votes A(v), for v ∈ V with A(v) = ℓ.
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Clearly, Bnd(A, ℓ) is ℓ-bounded and Reg(A′, ℓ) is ℓ-regular.
Now, let {fℓ}ℓ≤m be the family of counting functions witnessing that F , when applied
to ℓ-regular profiles, is an ABC counting rule (cf. Lemma 5). From {fℓ}ℓ≤m we will now
construct a single counting function f that witnesses that F is an ABC counting rule.
Since f and fℓ have to produce the same output on ℓ-regular profiles, it would be tempting
to define f(x, ℓ) = fℓ(x, ℓ). However, this simple construction does not work. Instead,
we will find constants γ1, . . . , γm such that f(x, ℓ) = γℓ · fℓ(x, ℓ) and show that with this
construction we indeed obtain a counting function implementing F .
For this construction, let us fix two arbitrary committees W ∗1 , W
∗
2 with the smallest
possible size of the intersection. In particular, W ∗1 ∩W
∗
2 = ∅ for m ≥ 2k. Let W
∗
1 \W
∗
2 =
{a1, . . . at}, and let W
∗
2 \W
∗
1 = {b1, . . . bt}. By σ
∗ we denote the permutation that swaps
a1 with b1, a2 with b2, etc., and that is the identity elsewhere.
We will define γ1, . . . , γm inductively. For the base case we set f(0, 0) = 0. Now, let us
assume that f is defined on [0, k]× [0, ℓ] and that f implements F on ℓ-bounded profiles.
To choose γℓ+1, we distinguish the following three cases:
Case (A). If in all (ℓ + 1)-regular profiles A it holds that W ∗1 =F(A) W
∗
2 , then we set
γℓ+1 = 0.
Case (B). If we are not in Case (A) and in all ℓ-bounded profiles A it holds that
W ∗1 =F(A) W
∗
2 , then we set γℓ+1 = 1.
Case (C). Otherwise, there exist a single-vote (ℓ+1)-regular profile A such thatW ∗1 6=F(A)
W ∗2 and a single-vote ℓ-bounded profile A
′ such that W ∗1 6=F(A′) W
∗
2 . Indeed, if for all
(ℓ + 1)-regular single-vote profiles A ∈ A(C, {1}) it holds that W ∗1 =F(A) W
∗
2 , then
by consistency this holds for all (ℓ + 1)-regular profiles, which is a precondition of
Case (A). Similarly, if for all ℓ-bounded single-vote profiles A ∈ A(C, {1}) it holds that
W ∗1 =F(A) W
∗
2 , then by consistency this holds for all ℓ-bounded profiles (precondition
of Case (B)). Consequently, the profiles A and A′ can be chosen to consist of single
votes.
In the following, by slight abuse of notation, we identify a set of approved candidates
with its corresponding single-vote profile. Let a∗ℓ+1 ⊆ C be a vote such that (i) |a
∗
ℓ+1| =
ℓ+ 1, (ii) W ∗1 ≻F(a∗ℓ+1) W
∗
2 , and (iii) such that the difference between the scores of W
∗
1
and W ∗2 is maximized. Furthermore, let b
∗
ℓ+1 ⊆ C be a vote such that (i) |b
∗
ℓ+1| ≤ ℓ,
(ii) W ∗1 ≻F(b∗ℓ+1) W
∗
2 , and (iii) such that the difference between the scores of W
∗
1 and
W ∗2 is maximized. For each x, y ∈ N we define the profile S(x, y) as:
S(x, y) = x · σ∗(a∗ℓ+1) + y · b
∗
ℓ+1.
Let us define t∗ℓ+1 as:
t∗ℓ+1 = sup
{x
y
: W ∗1 ≻S(x,y) W
∗
2
}
, (4)
28
which is a well-defined positive real number as we show in Lemma 6. We define:
γℓ+1 =
scf(W
∗
1 , b
∗
ℓ+1)− scf(W
∗
2 , b
∗
ℓ+1)
t∗ℓ+1 ·
(
scfℓ+1(W
∗
1 , a
∗
ℓ+1)− scfℓ+1(W
∗
2 , a
∗
ℓ+1)
) .
This concludes the construction of f . Let us now show that t∗ℓ+1 is a positive real
number and that it defines a threshold:
Lemma 6. The supremum t∗ℓ+1, as defined by Equation (4), is a positive real number.
Furthermore, if x/y < t∗ℓ+1, then W
∗
1 ≻S(x,y) W
∗
2 . If x/y > t
∗
ℓ+1, then W
∗
2 ≻S(x,y) W
∗
1 .
Proof. Let us argue that t∗ℓ+1 is well defined. By continuity there exists y such that
W ∗1 ≻S(1,y) W
∗
2 . Consequently, the set in (4) is nonempty. Also by continuity, there exists
x such that W ∗2 ≻S(x,1) W
∗
1 . Further, we observe that for each x
′, y′ with x′/y′ > x it
also holds that W ∗2 ≻S(x′,y′) W
∗
1 . Indeed, since S(x
′, y′) = S(xy′, y′) + S(x′ − xy′, 0), we
infer that in such case S(x′, y′) can be split into y′ copies of S(x, 1) and x′− xy′ copies of
σ∗(a∗ℓ+1). By consistency we get W
∗
2 ≻S(x′,y′) W
∗
1 . Thus, the set in (4) is bounded, and so
t∗ℓ+1 is a positive real number.
To show the second statement, let us assume that x/y < t∗ℓ+1. From the definition of t
∗
ℓ+1
we infer that there exist x′, y′ ∈ N, such that x/y < x′/y′ and such thatW ∗1 ≻S(x′,y′) W
∗
2 . By
consistency, it also holds that W ∗1 ≻S(xx′,xy′) W
∗
2 . Since W
∗
1 ≻S(0,1) W
∗
2 and x
′y − xy′ > 0
and we get that W ∗1 ≻S(0,x′y−xy′) W
∗
2 . Now, observe that
S(xx′, x′y) = S(xx′, xy′) + S(0, x′y − xy′).
Thus, from consistency infer that W ∗1 ≻S(xx′,x′y) W
∗
2 . Again, by consistency we get that
W ∗1 ≻S(x,y) W
∗
2 .
Next, let us assume that x/y > t∗ℓ+1. Then, there exist x
′, y′ ∈ N, such that x/y > x′/y′
and such that W ∗2 ≻S(x′,y′) W
∗
1 . Similarly as before, we get that W
∗
2 ≻S(x′y,yy′) W
∗
1 and
since xy′ − x′y > 0 we get that W ∗2 ≻S(xy′−x′y,0) W
∗
1 . Since S(xy
′, yy′) = S(x′y, yy′) +
S(xy′−x′y, 0), consistency implies thatW ∗2 ≻S(xy′,yy′) W
∗
1 . Finally, we get thatW
∗
2 ≻S(x,y)
W ∗1 , which completes the proof.
In the remainder of this section, we prove that f is indeed a counting function that
implements F and thus F is an ABC counting rule. We prove this for increasingly general
profiles, starting with very simple ones, and at first we prove a slightly weaker relation
between f and F .
Lemma 7. Let us fix ℓ ∈ [m − 1]. Let A ∈ A(C, V ) be an approval profile with A(v) ∈
{a∗ℓ+1, b
∗
ℓ+1, σ
∗(a∗ℓ+1), σ
∗(b∗ℓ+1)} for all v ∈ V . Then:
scf(W
∗
1 , A) > scf(W
∗
2 , A) =⇒ W
∗
1 ≻F(A) W
∗
2 .
Proof. We start by noting that if b∗ℓ+1 and a
∗
ℓ+1 are defined, then Case (C) occurred when
defining γℓ+1. In particular, t
∗
ℓ+1 has been defined and Lemma 6 is applicable.
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First we show that if A contains both a∗ℓ+1 and σ
∗(a∗ℓ+1), then after removing both
from A the relative order of W ∗1 and W
∗
2 does not change. Without loss of generality,
let us assume that W ∗1 ≻F(A) W
∗
2 and consider the profile Q that consist of two votes,
a∗ℓ+1 and σ
∗(a∗ℓ+1). By neutrality, W
∗
1 and W
∗
2 are equally good with respect to Q. If
W ∗2 F(A−Q) W
∗
1 , then by consistency we would get that W
∗
2 F(A) W
∗
1 , a contradiction.
By the same argument we observe that if A contains b∗ℓ+1 and σ
∗(b∗ℓ+1), then after removing
them from A the relative order ofW ∗1 andW
∗
2 does not change. Further if A contains only
votes b∗ℓ+1 and a
∗
ℓ+1, then by consistency we can infer that W
∗
1 is preferred over W
∗
2 in A.
Also, A cannot contain only votes σ∗(b∗ℓ+1) and σ
∗(a∗ℓ+1), since in both these single-vote
profiles the score of W ∗2 is greater than the score of W
∗
1 (this follows from Lemma 5 and
from the fact that f for ℓ-regular profiles is a linear transformation of an appropriate
counting function fℓ).
The above reasoning shows that without loss of generality we can assume that in A
there are either only the votes of types b∗ℓ+1 and σ
∗(a∗ℓ+1) or only the votes of types a
∗
ℓ+1
and σ∗(b∗ℓ+1). Let us consider the first case, and let us assume that in A there are yA votes
of type b∗ℓ+1 and xA votes of type σ
∗(a∗ℓ+1). Since scf (W
∗
1 , A) > scf(W
∗
2 , A), we get that:
yA · scf(W
∗
1 , b
∗
ℓ+1) + xA · scf (W
∗
1 , σ
∗(a∗ℓ+1)) > yA · scf (W
∗
2 , b
∗
ℓ+1) + xA · scf (W
∗
2 , σ
∗(a∗ℓ+1)).
Thus, from the definition of σ∗ we get that:
yA · scf (W
∗
1 , b
∗
ℓ+1) + xA · scf (W
∗
2 , a
∗
ℓ+1) > yA · scf (W
∗
2 , b
∗
ℓ+1) + xA · scf (W
∗
1 , a
∗
ℓ+1).
Which is equivalent to:
xA ·
(
scf (W
∗
1 , a
∗
ℓ+1)− scf (W
∗
2 , a
∗
ℓ+1)
)
< yA ·
(
scf(W
∗
1 , b
∗
ℓ+1)− scf(W
∗
2 , b
∗
ℓ+1)
)
.
From the above inequality we get that:
xA
yA
<
scf(W
∗
1 , b
∗
ℓ+1)− scf (W
∗
2 , b
∗
ℓ+1)
scf (W
∗
1 , a
∗
ℓ+1)− scf (W
∗
2 , a
∗
ℓ+1)
=
scf(W
∗
1 , b
∗
ℓ+1)− scf(W
∗
2 , b
∗
ℓ+1)
γℓ+1
(
scfℓ+1(W
∗
1 , a
∗
ℓ+1)− scfℓ+1(W
∗
2 , a
∗
ℓ+1)
) = t∗ℓ+1.
Observe that A = S(xA, yA), so since xA/yA < t
∗
ℓ+1, from Lemma 6 we infer that W
∗
1 ≻F(A)
W ∗2 .
Now, let us assume that A consists only of the votes of types a∗ℓ+1 and σ
∗(b∗ℓ+1). In
such case the profile σ∗(A) consists only of votes of types b∗ℓ+1 and σ
∗(a∗ℓ+1). Further,
scf(W
∗
2 , σ
∗(A)) > scf(W
∗
1 , σ
∗(A)). Similarly as before, let us assume that in σ∗(A) there
are yA votes of type b
∗
ℓ+1 and xA votes of type σ
∗(a∗ℓ+1). By similar reasoning as before we
infer that xA/yA > t∗ℓ+1, and by Lemma 6 that W
∗
2 ≻F(σ∗(A)) W
∗
1 . From this, by neutrality,
it follows that W ∗1 ≻F(A) W
∗
2 , which completes the proof.
Next, we generalize Lemma 7 to arbitrary profiles, yet we still focus on comparing the
two distinguished profiles W ∗1 and W
∗
2 .
Lemma 8. For all A ∈ A(C, V ) it holds that
scf(W
∗
1 , A) > scf(W
∗
2 , A) =⇒ W
∗
1 ≻F(A) W
∗
2 .
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Proof. We prove this statement by induction on ℓ-bounded profiles. For 0-bounded profiles
A this is trivial since scf(W
∗
1 , A) > scf(W
∗
2 , A) cannot hold.
Assume that the statement holds for ℓ-bounded profiles and assume that scf (W
∗
1 , A) >
scf(W
∗
2 , A). If Case (A) was applicable when defining γℓ+1, i.e., if γℓ+1 = 0, then
scf(W
∗
1 , A) > scf(W
∗
2 , A) implies scf(W
∗
1 ,Bnd(A, ℓ)) > scf(W
∗
2 ,Bnd(A, ℓ)) since the
score of (ℓ + 1)-regular profiles is 0. This implies by the induction hypothesis that
W ∗1 ≻F(Bnd(A,ℓ)) W
∗
2 . Furthermore, since Case (A) was applicable, W
∗
1 =F(Reg(A,ℓ+1)) W
∗
2 .
Since A = Bnd(A, ℓ) + Reg(A, ℓ+ 1), consistency yields that W ∗1 ≻F(A) W
∗
2 .
In Case (B), we know thatW ∗1 =F(A) W
∗
2 for all ℓ-bounded profiles. HenceW
∗
1 =F(Bnd(A,ℓ))
W ∗2 . By our induction hypothesis, this implies that scf(W
∗
1 ,Bnd(A, i)) = scf (W
∗
2 ,Bnd(A, i)).
Hence scf(W
∗
1 ,Reg(A, ℓ+ 1)) > scf (W
∗
2 ,Reg(A, ℓ+ 1)). Recall that Lemma 5 states that
fℓ+1 implements F on (ℓ+1)-regular profiles. Since Reg(A, ℓ+1) is an (ℓ+1)-regular profile
and f(x, ℓ+1) = fℓ+1(x, ℓ+1), in particular scf(W
∗
1 ,Reg(A, ℓ+1)) > scf(W
∗
2 ,Reg(A, ℓ+1))
implies W ∗1 ≻F(Reg(A,ℓ+1)) W
∗
2 . Furthermore, by consistency, W
∗
1 has the same relative po-
sition as W ∗2 in F(Reg(A, ℓ+ 1)) and F(A), which in turn implies W
∗
1 ≻F(A) W
∗
2 .
In Case (C), for the sake of contradiction let us assume that W ∗2 F(A) W
∗
1 . Let us
take an arbitrary vote v ∈ V with A(v) /∈ {b∗ℓ+1, a
∗
ℓ+1, σ
∗(b∗ℓ+1), σ
∗(a∗ℓ+1)}. We will show in
the following that there exists a profile A′ with set(A′) = set(A) \ {A(v)}, scf(W
∗
1 , A
′) >
scf(W
∗
2 , A
′), andW ∗2 F(A′) W
∗
1 . We then repeat this step until we obtain a profile A
′′ with
set(A′′) = {b∗ℓ+1, a
∗
ℓ+1, σ
∗(b∗ℓ+1), σ
∗(a∗ℓ+1)}. Still, it holds that scf (W
∗
1 , A
′′) > scf (W
∗
2 , A
′′)
and W ∗2 F(A′′) W
∗
1 , but that contradicts Lemma 7. Consequently, W
∗
1 ≻F(A) W
∗
2 has to
hold.
Let us now show that there exists a profile A′ with set(A′) = set(A) \ {A(v)},
scf(W
∗
1 , A
′) > scf(W
∗
2 , A
′), and W ∗2 F(A′) W
∗
1 . If W
∗
1 =F(A(v)) W
∗
2 , then by consis-
tency the relative order of W ∗1 and W
∗
2 in F(A
′) is the same as in F(A). Also, since
the scores of committees W ∗1 and W
∗
2 are the same in v (cf. Lemma 5), we get that
scf(W
∗
1 , A
′) > scf (W
∗
2 , A
′).
Let us now consider the case thatW ∗1 ≻F(A(v)) W
∗
2 . Let nv = |{v
′ ∈ V : A(v′) = A(v)}|.
We set
ǫ = scf(W
∗
1 , A)− scf (W
∗
2 , A) > 0. (5)
We distinguish two cases: |A(v)| ≤ ℓ and |A(v)| = ℓ+ 1. Let us consider |A(v)| ≤ ℓ first.
We observe that there exist values x, y ∈ N such that:
0 <
x
y
(
scf (W
∗
1 , σ
∗(b∗ℓ+1))− scf(W
∗
2 , σ
∗(b∗ℓ+1))
)
+ nv
(
scf (W
∗
1 , v)− scf(W
∗
2 , v)
)
<
ǫ
2
. (6)
Now, consider a profile B = y ·A+ x · σ∗(b∗ℓ+1) + x · b
∗
ℓ+1. By consistency, W
∗
2 F(B) W
∗
1 .
Next, let us consider a profile Q = x ·σ∗(b∗ℓ+1)+y ·nv ·A(v). From Equality (6) we see that
W ∗1 has a higher score in Q than W
∗
2 . Since Q is ℓ-bounded, by our inductive assumption
we get that W ∗1 ≻F(Q) W
∗
2 . Consequently, by consistency we get that W
∗
2 ≻F(B−Q) W
∗
1
since otherwise W ∗1 ≻F(B) W
∗
2 , a contradiction. Further, from Equalities (5) and (6) we
get that in B −Q the score of W ∗1 is greater than the score of W
∗
2 , which can be seen as
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follows:
scf (W
∗
1 , B −Q)− scf(W
∗
2 , B −Q)
= scf(W
∗
1 , B)− scf(W
∗
2 , B)− (scf (W
∗
1 , Q)− scf (W
∗
2 , Q))
= yǫ− (scf (W
∗
1 , Q)− scf(W
∗
2 , Q)) >
yǫ
2
.
We obtained the profile B−Q = y ·A+x(σ∗(b∗ℓ+1)+b
∗
ℓ+1)−x·σ
∗(b∗ℓ+1)−y ·nv ·A(v) = y ·(A−
nv ·A(v))+x·b
∗
ℓ+1, for which set(B−Q) = set(A)\{A(v)}. Furthermore, the relative order
ofW ∗1 andW
∗
2 in F(B−Q) is the same as in F(A), and scf (W
∗
1 , B−Q) > scf(W
∗
2 , B−Q).
Let us now turn to the case that |A(v)| = ℓ+ 1. Similar to before, we choose x, y ∈ N
such that:
0 <
x
y
(
scf (W
∗
1 , σ
∗(a∗ℓ+1))− scf(W
∗
2 , σ
∗(a∗ℓ+1))
)
+ nv
(
scf(W
∗
1 , v)− scf (W
∗
2 , v)
)
<
ǫ
2
. (7)
Now, consider a profile B = y · A + x · σ∗(a∗ℓ+1) + x · a
∗
ℓ+1 for which, by consistency,
W ∗2 F(B) W
∗
1 holds. Let Q = x · σ
∗(a∗ℓ+1) + y · nv · A(v). From Equality (7) we see
that W ∗1 has a higher score in Q than W
∗
2 . Since Q is (ℓ+ 1)-regular, Lemma 5 gives us
that W ∗1 ≻F(Q) W
∗
2 . As before, by consistency we get that W
∗
2 ≻F(B−Q) W
∗
1 , and from
Equalities (5) and (7) we get that scf (W
∗
1 , B −Q) > scf(W
∗
2 , B −Q). Hence, also in this
case, we have obtained the profile B − Q, for which set(B − Q) = set(A) \ {A(v)}, the
relative order of W ∗1 and W
∗
2 in F(B−Q) is the same as in F(A), and scf (W
∗
1 , B−Q) >
scf(W
∗
2 , B −Q).
Finally, if W ∗2 ≻F(A(v)) W
∗
1 in v, we can repeat the above reasoning, but applying σ∗
to all occurrences of b∗ℓ+1, a
∗
ℓ+1, σ
∗(b∗ℓ+1), and σ
∗(a∗ℓ+1).
Before we proceed further, we establish the existence of two particular profiles A∗ℓ and
B∗ℓ , that we will need for proving the most general variant of our statement.
Lemma 9. Let W1,W2,W3 ∈ Pk(C) such that |W1 ∩ W3| > |W1 ∩ W2|. For each ℓ,
1 ≤ ℓ ≤ m, if F is non-trivial for ℓ-regular profiles, then there exist two ℓ-regular profiles,
A∗ℓ and B
∗
ℓ , such that:
1. scf(W1, A
∗
ℓ) = scf(W3, A
∗
ℓ) > scf(W2, A
∗
ℓ) and W1 =F(A∗ℓ ) W3 ≻F(A∗ℓ ) W2,
2. scf(W1, B
∗
ℓ ) = scf(W3, B
∗
ℓ ) < scf(W2, B
∗
ℓ ) and W1 =F(B∗ℓ ) W3 ≺F(B∗ℓ ) W2.
Proof. Let c be a candidate such that c ∈ W1 ∩W3 and c /∈ W2. Such a candidate exists
because |W1∩W3| > |W1∩W2|. Profile A
∗
ℓ contains, for each S ⊆ C \{c} with |S| = ℓ−1,
a vote with approval set S∪{c}. First, let us note that all committees that contain c have
the same fℓ-score in A
∗
ℓ : this follows from neutrality, since the profile A
∗
ℓ is symmetric
with respect to committees containing c, in particular W1 and W3. Let s denote the score
of such committees.
Next, we will argue that scfℓ(W2, A
∗
ℓ) < s. To see this, let c
′ ∈ W2 and consider a
committee W ′2 = (W2 \ {c
′}) ∪ {c}. Since f implements F , there exists x ≤ k such that
fℓ(x, ℓ) > fℓ(x − 1, ℓ). Due to Proposition 1 we can assume that m − ℓ ≥ k − (x −
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1); otherwise this difference between fℓ(x, ℓ) and fℓ(x − 1, ℓ) would not be relevant for
computing scores. Let T ⊆ C \ {c, c′} such that |T | = ℓ − 1 and |T ∩W2| = x − 1. To
show that such a T exists, we have to prove that there exist (ℓ−1)− (x−1) candidates in
(C \W2) \ {c, c
′}. This is the case since m− ℓ ≥ k− (x−1) and thus |(C \W2) \ {c, c
′}| =
m− k − 1 ≥ ℓ− x.
Now let v be the vote in A∗ℓ with approval set T ∪ {c}. Since fℓ(x, ℓ) > fℓ(x− 1, ℓ),
fℓ(|A
∗
ℓ(v) ∩W
′
2|, |A
∗
ℓ(v)|) > fℓ(|A
∗
ℓ(v) ∩W2|, |A
∗
ℓ(v)|).
Furthermore, for all votes v′ in A∗ℓ :
fℓ(|A
∗
ℓ(v
′) ∩W ′2|, |A
∗
ℓ(v)|) ≥ fℓ(|A
∗
ℓ(v
′) ∩W2|, |A
∗
ℓ(v)|).
Hence, scfℓ(W
′
2, A
∗
ℓ) > scfℓ(W2, A
∗
ℓ). Since f(x, ℓ) = γℓ · fℓ(x, ℓ) we get scf(W
′
2, A
∗
ℓ) >
scf(W2, A
∗
ℓ). Further, by a previous argument we have scf (W1, A
∗
ℓ) = scf(W
′
2, A
∗
ℓ), thus
by transitivity we conclude that scf(W1, A
∗
ℓ) > scf(W2, A
∗
ℓ).
Next, let us construct profile B∗ℓ . In this case we choose c such that c ∈ W2 and
c /∈ W1∪W3. Again, this is possible because |W3 \W1| = k−|W1∩W3| < k−|W1∩W2| =
|W2 \W1| and hence W2 6⊆W1∪W3. Similarly as before, B
∗
ℓ contains a vote with approval
set S ∪ {c} for each S ⊆ C \ {c} with |S| = ℓ− 1. With similar arguments as before we
can show that all committees that contain c have the same score in B∗ℓ (in particular W2)
and this score is larger than the score of committees that do not contain c (in particular
W1 and W3).
Finally, the statements concerning F follow from Lemma 5 since both A∗ℓ and B
∗
ℓ are
ℓ-regular.
We further generalize Lemma 7 and 8 so to allow us to compare W ∗1 with arbitrary
profiles. This is the final step; we can then proceed with a direct proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 10. For all A ∈ A(C, V ) and W ∈ Pk(C) it holds that
scf(W
∗
1 , A) > scf (W,A) =⇒ W
∗
1 ≻F(A) W .
Proof. We prove this statement by induction on ℓ-bounded profiles. As in Lemma 8, for
0-bounded profiles A the statement is trivial since scf(W
∗
1 , A) > scf(W,A) cannot hold.
In order to prove the inductive step, we assume that the statement holds for ℓ-bounded
profiles. Let A be an (ℓ + 1)-bounded profile and assume that scf(W
∗
1 , A) > scf (W,A).
We will show that W ∗1 ≻F(A) W . If Case (A) or (B) was applicable when defining γℓ+1,
the same arguments as in Lemma 8 yield that W ∗1 ≻F(A) W .
If Case (C) was applicable when defining γℓ+1 and if |W
∗
1 ∩W | = |W
∗
1 ∩W
∗
2 |, then
the statement of the lemma follows from Lemma 8 and neutrality. Recall that we fixed
W ∗1 and W
∗
2 as two committees with the smallest possible size of the intersection. Thus,
if |W ∗1 ∩W | 6= |W
∗
1 ∩W
∗
2 | then |W
∗
1 ∩W | > |W
∗
1 ∩W
∗
2 |. For the sake of contradiction let
us assume that W A W
∗
1 . Let scf (W
∗
1 , A)− scf(W,A) = ǫ > 0.
Now, from A we create a new profile B in the following way. Let us consider two cases:
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Case 1: scf(W
∗
2 ,Bnd(A, ℓ))− scf(W,Bnd(A, ℓ)) ≥ 0.
Let Q be an ℓ-bounded profile where:
scf (W
∗
1 , Q) = scf(W,Q) > scf (W
∗
2 , Q).
Such a profile exists due to Lemma 9. Since scf (W
∗
2 , Q)− scf (W,Q) is negative, there
exist such x ∈ N, y ∈ N ∪ {0} that x ≥ 2 and
0 ≤
(
scf(W
∗
2 ,Bnd(A, ℓ))− scf (W,Bnd(A, ℓ))
)
+ y/x ·
(
scf(W
∗
2 , Q)− scf(W,Q)
)
< ǫ/2,
which is equivalent to
0 ≤ scf(W
∗
2 , xBnd(A, ℓ) + yQ)− scf(W,xBnd(A, ℓ) + yQ) < xǫ/2. (8)
We set B = xA + yQ.
Case 2: scf(W
∗
2 ,Bnd(A, ℓ))− scf(W,Bnd(A, ℓ)) < 0.
In this case our reasoning is very similar. Let Q be an ℓ-bounded profile where:
scf (W
∗
2 , Q) > scf(W
∗
1 , Q) = scf (W,Q).
Again, similarly as before, we observe that there exist such x, y ∈ N that x ≥ 1 and:
0 ≤
(
scf(W
∗
2 ,Bnd(A, ℓ))− scf (W,Bnd(A, ℓ))
)
+ y/x ·
(
scf(W
∗
2 , Q)− scf(W,Q)
)
< ǫ/2,
which is equivalent to Inequality (8). Here, we also set B = xA+ yQ.
By similar transformation as before, but applied to Reg(B, ℓ + 1) rather than to
Bnd(B, ℓ), we construct a profile D from B:
Case 1: scf(W
∗
2 ,Reg(B, ℓ+ 1))− scf(W,Reg(B, ℓ+ 1)) ≥ 0.
Due to Lemma 9 there exists an (ℓ+ 1)-regular profile Q′ with
scf(W
∗
1 , Q
′) = scf (W,Q
′) > scf (W
∗
2 , Q
′).
Similarly as before, there exist x′ ∈ N, y′ ∈ N ∪ {0} such that
0 ≤ scf(W
∗
2 , x
′Reg(B, ℓ+ 1) + y′Q′)− scf(W,x
′Reg(B, ℓ+ 1) + y′Q′) < x′ǫ/2. (9)
We set D = x′B + y′Q′.
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Case 2: scf(W
∗
2 ,Reg(A, ℓ+ 1))− scf(W,Reg(A, ℓ+ 1)) < 0.
Here, let Q′ be an (ℓ+ 1)-regular profile such that
scf(W
∗
1 , Q
′) = scf (W,Q
′) > scf (W
∗
2 , Q
′).
There exist x′, y′ ∈ N such that Inequality (9) is satisfied. We set D = x′B + y′Q′.
Let us analyze the resulting profile D = x′xA + x′yQ + y′Q′. By our assumption we
know that W A W
∗
1 , thus by consistency we get that W xx′A W
∗
1 . Since W =F(Q) W
∗
1
and W =F(Q′) W
∗
1 due to Lemma 9, from consistency it follows that W F(D) W
∗
1 .
Further, since Q is ℓ-bounded and Q′ is (ℓ+ 1)-regular,
D = x′xA + x′yQ+ y′Q′
= Bnd(x′xA+ x′yQ+ y′Q′, ℓ) + Reg(x′B + y′Q′, ℓ+ 1)
= Bnd(x′xA+ x′yQ, ℓ) + Reg(x′B + y′Q′, ℓ+ 1)
= x′Bnd(xA+ yQ, ℓ) + Reg(x′B + y′Q′, ℓ+ 1).
Inequalities (8) and (9) imply thatW ∗2 has a higher score thanW in profiles x
′(xBnd(A, ℓ)+
yQ) = x′Bnd(xA + yQ, ℓ) and x′Reg(B, ℓ + 1) + y′Q′ = Reg(x′B + y′Q′, ℓ + 1). From
our inductive assumption we get that W ∗2 is preferred over W in x
′Bnd(xA+ yQ, ℓ), and
by Lemma 5 we get that W ∗2 is preferred over W in Reg(x
′B + y′Q′, ℓ + 1). Consistency
implies that W ∗2 F(D) W , and thus W
∗
2 F(D) W F(D) W
∗
1 .
Now we observe that
scf(W
∗
1 ,Bnd(xA + yQ, ℓ))− scf (W
∗
2 ,Bnd(xA + yQ, ℓ))
=
(
scf (W
∗
1 ,Bnd(xA + yQ, ℓ))− scf (W,Bnd(xA + yQ, ℓ))
)
+
(
scf(W,Bnd(xA+ yQ, ℓ))− scf(W
∗
2 ,Bnd(xA + yQ, ℓ))
)
≥
(
scf(W
∗
1 ,Bnd(xA+ yQ, ℓ))− scf(W,Bnd(xA+ yQ, ℓ))
)
−
xǫ
2
=
(
scf (W
∗
1 ,Bnd(xA, ℓ))− scf(W,Bnd(xA, ℓ))
)
−
xǫ
2
.
and
scf(W
∗
1 ,Reg(x
′B + y′Q′, ℓ+ 1))− scf(W
∗
2 ,Reg(x
′B + y′Q′, ℓ+ 1))
=
(
scf(W
∗
1 ,Reg(x
′B + y′Q′, ℓ+ 1))− scf(W,Reg(x
′B + y′Q′, ℓ+ 1))
)
+
(
scf (W,Reg(x
′B + y′Q′, ℓ+ 1))− scf(W
∗
2 ,Reg(x
′B + y′Q′, ℓ+ 1))
)
≥
(
scf(W
∗
1 ,Reg(x
′B + y′Q′, ℓ+ 1))− scf (W,Reg(x
′B + y′Q′, ℓ+ 1))
)
−
x′ǫ
2
=
(
scf(W
∗
1 ,Reg(x
′B, ℓ+ 1))− scf (W,Reg(x
′B, ℓ+ 1))
)
−
x′ǫ
2
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=
(
scf(W
∗
1 ,Reg(x
′xA, ℓ + 1))− scf(W,Reg(x
′xA, ℓ + 1))
)
−
x′ǫ
2
.
By combining the above two inequalities we get that
scf(W
∗
1 , D)− scf (W
∗
2 , D)
= x′ ·
(
scf(W
∗
1 ,Bnd(xA + yQ, ℓ))− scf (W,Bnd(xA + yQ, ℓ))
)
+
(
scf(W
∗
1 ,Reg(x
′B + y′Q′, ℓ+ 1))− scf(W,Reg(x
′B + y′Q′, ℓ+ 1))
)
≥ x′ ·
(
scf (W
∗
1 ,Bnd(xA, ℓ))− scf (W,Bnd(xA, ℓ))
)
+
(
scf(W
∗
1 ,Reg(x
′xA, ℓ + 1))− scf(W,Reg(x
′xA, ℓ + 1))
)
−
(x′ + xx′)ǫ
2
= xx′ ·
(
scf(W
∗
1 , A)− scf(W,A)
)
−
(x′ + xx′)ǫ
2
= xx′ǫ−
(x′ + xx′)ǫ
2
=
(xx′ − x′)ǫ
2
> 0.
Summarizing, we obtained a profile D, such that scf (W
∗
1 , D) > scf(W
∗
2 , D) andW
∗
2 ≻F(D)
W ∗1 . This, however, contradicts Lemma 8. Hence, we have proven the inductive step,
which completes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 10 allows us to prove Theorem 1, our characterization of ABC counting rules.
Finalizing the proof of Theorem 1. Let F satisfy symmetry, consistency, weak efficiency,
and continuity. If F is trivial, then f(x, y) = 0 implements F .
If F is non-trivial, we construct f , W ∗1 , and W
∗
2 as described above. We claim that
for A ∈ A(C, V ) and W1,W2 ∈ Pk(C) it holds that scf(W1, A) > scf (W2, A) if and
only if W1 ≻F(A) W2. By neutrality, Lemma 10 is applicable to any pair of committees
W1,W2 ∈ Pk(C): if scf(W1, A) > scf (W2, A) then W1 ≻F(A) W2.
Now, for the other direction, instead of showing thatW1 ≻F(A) W2 implies scf(W1, A) >
scf(W2, A), we show that scf(W1, A) = scf(W2, A) implies W1 =F(A) W2. Note that
Lemma 10 does not apply to committees with the same score. For the sake of con-
tradiction let scf (W1, A) = scf(W2, A) but W1 ≻F(A) W2. As a first step, we prove
that there exists a profile B with scf (W2, B) > scf (W1, B) and W2 ≻F(B) W1. Since
W1 ≻F(A) W2 and by neutrality, there exists a profile A
′ ∈ A(C, V ) with W2 ≻F(A′) W1.
Thus, there exists an ℓ ∈ [m] such that W2 ≻F(Reg(A′,ℓ)) W1, because otherwise, by con-
sistency, W1 F(A′) W2 would hold; let B = Reg(A
′, ℓ). Now, Lemma 5 guarantees that
scfℓ(W2, B) > scfℓ(W1, B). Since f(x, ℓ) = γℓ ·fℓ(x, ℓ), also scf(W2, B) > scf(W1, B). Ob-
serve that for each n ∈ N we have scf (W2, B+nA) > scf(W1, B+nA). Thus, by Lemma 10
for each n, W2 ≻F(B+nA) W1, which contradicts continuity of F . Hence scf(W1, A) =
scf(W2, A) implies W1 =F(A) W2 and, consequently, scf(W1, A) > scf(W2, A) if and only
if W1 ≻F(A) W2. We see that f implements F and thus F is an ABC counting rule.
Finally, as we already noted, an ABC counting rule satisfies symmetry, consistency,
weak efficiency, and continuity: this follows immediately from the definitions.
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A.3 Independence of Axioms
The set of axioms used in the statement of Theorem 1 is minimal, subject to the following
remark: We cannot formally prove that anonymity is required, since consistency and con-
tinuity implicitly assume anonymity as they use addition of profiles. Without anonymity,
A + A′ is ill-defined as it does not preserve the mapping from voters to approval sets.
While it would be possible to find formulations of consistency and continuity that are
independent of anonymity, this would introduce technicalities without relevant benefits.
As a consequence, we do not formally show that anonymity is independent from other
axioms, but note that—informally—anonymity is required so as to use consistency and
continuity.
Let us consider the variation of AV where the score of a fixed candidate c is doubled.
Formally, the score of a committee W is defined as
∑
v∈V |A(v) ∩ W | + |{v ∈ V : c ∈
A(v)∩W}|. This rule satisfies all axioms except for neutrality. Next, consider Proportional
Approval Voting where ties are broken by Multi-Winner Approval Voting. This rule—let
us call it F∗—satisfies all axiom except for continuity: consider the profile A = ({c}) and
A′ = ({a, b}, {a, b}, {c}). It holds that {a, b} ≻F∗(A′) {a, c} because the PAV-score of both
committees is 3, but the AV-score of {a, b} is 4 and only 3 for {a, c}. However, it holds
that {a, c} ≻F∗(A+nA′) {a, b} for arbitrary n because the PAV-scores of {a, c} and {a, b}
are 3n+ 1 and 3n, respectively.
To see that consistency is independent, consider an ABC ranking rule that is PAV on
party-list profiles (i.e., D’Hondt) and the trivial rule otherwise. This rule fails consistency,
since the addition of two party-list profiles may not be a party-list profile. All other axioms
are satisfied by it: symmetry and weak efficiency are easy to see, continuity follows from
the fact that in non-party-list profiles all committees are winning. Finally, the rule which
reverses the output of Multi-Winner Approval Voting (i.e., f(x, y) = −x) satisfies all
axioms except for weak efficiency.
B Omitted Proof Details
Lemma 1. A neutral, consistent and weak efficient ABC ranking rule satisfies efficiency.
Proof. Let F be an ABC ranking rule that satisfies neutrality, consistency and weak
efficiency. Further, let W1,W2 ∈ Pk(C) and A ∈ A(C, V ) such that for every vote
v ∈ V we have |A(v) ∩W1| ≥ |A(v) ∩W2|. We have to show that W1 F(A) W2. Fix
v ∈ V and let Av ∈ A(C, {1}) be the profile containing the single vote A(v). Now,
let us consider a committee W ′2 constructed from W2 in the following way. We obtain
W ′2 from W2 by replacing candidates in W2 \ A(v) with candidates from A(v) so that
|A(v) ∩W ′2| = |A(v) ∩W1|. Note that A(v) ∩W2 ⊆ A(v) ∩W
′
2 and hence candidates in
A(v)∩ (W2 \W
′
2) = ∅. Hence by weak efficiency we get that W
′
2 F(Av) W2. Furthermore,
neutrality implies that W ′2 =F(Av) W1 and by transitivity we infer that W1 F(Av) W2.
The final step is to apply consistency. For every v ∈ V , W1 F(Av) W2. Hence also for
their combination
∑
v∈V Av = A we have W1 F(A) W2.
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Proposition 1. Let Dm,k = {(x, y) ∈ [0, k] × [0, m − 1] : x ≤ y ∧ k − x ≤ m − y} and
let f, g be counting functions. If there exist c ∈ R and d : [m] → R such that f(x, y) =
c · g(x, y) + d(y) for all x, y ∈ Dm,k then f, g implement the same ABC counting rule,
i.e., for all approval profiles A ∈ A(C, V ) and committees W1,W2 ∈ Pk(C) it holds that
W1 ≻f(A) W2 if and only if W1 ≻g(A) W2.
Proof. Let A ∈ A(C, V ) and W ∈ Pk(C). Let D ⊆ [0, k]× [0, m] be the domain of f and
g that is actually used in the computation of scf(W,A) and scg(W,A). We will show that
D ⊆ Dm,k ∪ {(k,m)}. (10)
Let v ∈ V , x = |A(v) ∩W |, and y = |A(v)|. If y = m, then x = |A(v) ∩W | = k and
condition (10) is satisfied. Let y < m. If y is sufficiently large (close to m), then A(v)∩W
cannot be empty. More precisely, it has to hold that the number of not approved members
of W , k−x, is at most equal to the total number of not approved candidates in v, m− y;
this yields that k − x ≤ m − y. Furthermore, x ≤ y (the number of approved members
of W must be at most equal to the total number of approved candidates). Consequently,
(x, y) ∈ Dm,k. This shows that condition (10) holds.
Consider functions f and g as in the statement of the proposition. We will now show
that for all W1,W2 ∈ Pk(C), it holds that:
scg(W1, A)− scg(W2, A) = c · (scf(W1, A)− scf(W2, A)).
Let Vi = {v ∈ V : |A(v)| = i} for i ∈ [m]. Now
scg(W1, A)− scg(W2, A) =
=
m∑
i=1
∑
v∈Vi
g(|A(v) ∩W1|, |A(v)|)− g(|A(v) ∩W2|, |A(v)|)
=
m−1∑
i=1
∑
v∈Vi
(
c · f(|A(v) ∩W1|, |A(v)|) + d(y)− c · f(|A(v) ∩W2|, |A(v)|)− d(y)
)
= c ·
∑
v∈V
(
f(|A(v) ∩W1|, |A(v)|)− f(|A(v) ∩W2|, |A(v)|)
)
= c · (scf (W1, A)− scf (W2, A))
Consequently, scg(W1, A) > scg(W2, A) if and only if scf(W1, A) > scf (W2, A), and so
W1 ≻f(A) W2 if and only if W1 ≻g(A) W2.
Lemma 2. An ABC ranking rule that satisfies neutrality, consistency, and D’Hondt pro-
portionality also satisfies weak efficiency.
Proof. Let F be an ABC ranking rule satisfying symmetry, consistency, and D’Hondt
proportionality. To show that F satisfies weak efficiency, it suffices to show that F
satisfies weak efficiency for single-voter profiles. Indeed, assume that F satisfies weak
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efficiency for single-voter profiles. Let W1,W2 ∈ Pk(C) and A ∈ A(C, V ) where no
voter approves a candidate in W2 \W1; we want to show that W1 F(A) W2. Since weak
efficiency holds for single-voter profiles, we know that W1 F(A(v)) W2 for all v ∈ V . By
consistency we can infer that W1 F(A) W2.
For the sake of contradiction let us assume that F does not satisfy weak efficiency
for single-voter profiles. This means that there exist X ⊆ C and W1,W2 ∈ Pk(C) such
that (W2 \ W1) ∩ X = ∅ and W2 ≻F(X) W1. First, we show that in such case there
exist W ∈ Pk−1(C), c, c
′ ∈ C with c ∈ X , c′ /∈ X , and W ∪ {c′} ≻F(X) W ∪ {c}. Let
z = |W1 ∩ X| − |W2 ∩ X|, and let us consider the following sequence of z operations
which define z new committees. We start with committee W2,1 = W2, and in the i-th
operation, i ∈ [z− 1], we construct W2,i+1 from W2,i by removing from W2,i one arbitrary
candidate in W2,i \X and by adding one candidate from (W1 \W2) ∩X . Consequently,
|W2,z ∩X| = |W1 ∩X|, so by neutrality we have W2,z =F(X) W1. By our assumption we
have that W2,1 ≻F(X) W2,z, thus, there exists i ∈ [z − 1] such that W2,i ≻F(X) W2,i+1.
The committees W2,i and W2,i+1 differ by one element only, so we set W = W2,i ∩W2,i+1,
c ∈ W2,i+1 \W2,i and c
′ ∈ W2,i \W2,i+1, and we have W ∪ {c
′} ≻F(X) W ∪ {c} for c ∈ X
and c′ /∈ X .
Let ℓ denote the number of members of W ∪ {c} which are approved in X , i.e.,
ℓ = |(W ∪ {c}) ∩ X|. Let us consider the following party-list profile A′. There are two
groups of voters: N1 with |N1| = ℓ and N2 with |N2| = k − ℓ. The voters in N1 approve
of X ; the voters in N2 approve C \ (X ∪ {c
′}). From D’Hondt proportionality we infer
that committee W ∪ {c} is winning:
1 =
|N1|
|(W ∪ {c}) ∩X|
>
|N2|
|(W ∪ {c}) ∩ (C \ (X ∪ {c′})|+ 1
=
k − ℓ
k − ℓ+ 1
,
1 =
|N2|
|(W ∪ {c}) ∩ (C \ (X ∪ {c′})|
>
|N1|
|(W ∪ {c}) ∩X|+ 1
=
ℓ
ℓ+ 1
.
This, however, yields a contradiction: Voters from N1 prefer W ∪ {c
′} over W ∪ {c} since
W ∪ {c′} ≻F(X) W ∪ {c}. For voters from N2 committees W ∪ {c
′} and W ∪ {c} are
equally good by neutrality. Hence, by consistency, it holds that W ∪{c′} ≻F(A′) W ∪{c},
a contradiction. We conclude that W1 F(X) W2 and hence weak efficiency holds for
single-voter profiles and—in consequence—for arbitrary profiles.
Proposition 2. Fix x, y ∈ N and let m ≥ y+ k− x+1. Let F be an ABC counting rule
satisfying lower quota, and let f be a counting function implementing F . It holds that:
f(x− 1, y) +
1
x
· f(1, 1) ·
k − x
k − x+ 1
≤ f(x, y) ≤ f(x− 1, y) +
1
x− 1
· f(1, 1).
Proof. Consider a party-list profile A with one group of voters N1 approving y candidates
and k − x + 1 groups of voters, N2, . . . , Nk−x+2, each approving a single candidate—for
each i ∈ [k− x+2] let Ci denote the set of candidates approved by voters from Ni. Each
of the remaining m − y − k + x − 1 candidates is not approved by any voter. We set
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|N1| = x(k − x+ 1), and for each i ≥ 2 we set |Ni| = k − x. Observe that:
k ·
|N1|
|V |
= k ·
x(k − x+ 1)
x(k − x+ 1) + (k − x+ 1)(k − x)
= k ·
x(k − x+ 1)
k(k − x+ 1)
= x.
From the lower quota property, we infer that there exists a winning committee W such
that |W ∩ C1| ≥ x, and from the pigeonhole principle we get that there exists i ≥ 2 with
W ∩ Ci = ∅; let Ci = {ci}. Thus, the score of committee W is higher than or equal
to the score of committee (W ∪ {ci}) \ {c} for c ∈ W ∩ C1. As a result we get that
f(x, y)|N1| ≥ f(x− 1, y)|N1|+ f(1, 1)|Ni|, which can be equivalently written as:
f(x, y) ≥ f(x− 1, y) +
1
x
· f(1, 1) ·
k − x
k − x+ 1
.
Now, consider another similar party-list profile, with the only difference that |N1| = x−1,
and |Ni| = 1 for i ≥ 2. Observe that for i ≥ 2:
k ·
|Ni|
|V |
= k ·
1
x− 1 + (k − x+ 1)
= 1.
Thus, for each i ≥ 2 we have that |W ∩ Ci| = 1. By a similar reasoning as before we get
that: f(1, 1)|Ni|+ f(x− 1, y)|N1| ≥ f(x, y)|N1|, which is equivalent to:
f(x, y) ≤ f(x− 1, y) +
1
x− 1
· f(1, 1).
This completes the proof.
C Disjoint equality with only two voters
As we discussed at the end of Section 4.2, in the original axiomatization of single-winner
Approval Voting it was sufficient to define disjoint equality for approval profiles with two
voters. This is not the case in our multi-winner setting. To show this, let us first define
a two-voter version of disjoint equality for ABC ranking rules:
Weak disjoint equality. An ABC ranking rule F satisfies weak disjoint equality if
for every A ∈ A(C, [2]) with A(1) ∩A(2) = ∅ the following holds:
(i) If |A(1) ∪ A(2)| ≥ k, then W ∈ Pk(C) is a winning committee if and only if
W ⊆ A(1) ∪ A(2).
(i) If |A(1) ∪ A(2)| < k, then W ∈ Pk(C) is a winning committee if and only if
W ⊃ A(1) ∪ A(2).
While weak disjoint equality may appear to be equally powerful as disjoint equality,
the following example shows that this is not the case. For a fixed k ≥ 3 let us consider a
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Thiele method implemented by the counting function
f(x, y) =


0.5 if x = 1,
k − 0.5 if x = k − 1,
x otherwise.
This being a Thiele method it satisfies symmetry, consistency, weak efficiency, and conti-
nuity. It also satisfies weak disjoint equality: Let |A(1) ∪A(2)| ≥ k. If W ⊆ A(1) ∪A(2)
and x = |A(1) ∩W |, then scf(W ) = f(x) + f(k − x) = k; if W \ (A(1) ∪A(2)) 6= ∅, then
scf(W ) < k. Hence W ∈ Pk(C) is a winning committee if and only if W ⊆ A(1) ∪A(2).
Now let |A(1)∪A(2)| < k. IfW ⊃ A(1)∪A(2), then scf(W ) = f(|A(1)|)+f(|A(2)|) =
|A(1)|+ |A(2)| ± 0.5; if (A(1)∪A(2)) \W 6= ∅, then scf (W ) ≤ |A(1)|+ |A(2)| − 1. Hence
W ∈ Pk(C) is a winning committee if and only if W ⊃ A(1) ∪ A(2).
We see that symmetry, consistency, weak efficiency, continuity, and weak disjoint
equality does not suffice to characterize Multi-Winner Approval Voting for committees of
size k ≥ 3.
D ABC Choice Rules
So far, we have discussed axiomatic questions concerning ABC ranking rules. We will
now consider ABC choice rules, i.e., approval-based multi-winner rules that select a set of
winning committees. As noted earlier, every ABC ranking rule F induces an ABC choice
rule by selecting the top-ranked committees in the weak order returned by F . From a
mathematical point of view, ABC choice rules are quite different from ABC ranking rules
since, in particular, losing committees under ABC choice rules are not distinguishable.
Thus, obtaining an axiomatic characterization of an ABC choice rule might require a
different approach than the one used for finding a characterization of a related ABC
ranking rule. This is also reflected in the literature on axiomatic characterization of
single-winner voting rules, where social welfare functions and social choice functions have
been usually considered separately, and corresponding characterizations often required
considerably different proofs (cf. the characterization of positional scoring rules (Young,
1974a, 1975)).
In this section we present a technique that allows to directly translate some of our
previous results for ABC ranking rules to ABC choice rules. In particular we show that
the axiomatic characterizations of PAV and CC can be transferred to the setting of ABC
choice rules. We start by formulating the relevant axioms from Section 3.2 so as to be
applicable to ABC choice rules.
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Anonymity. An ABC choice rule R is anonymous if for each two (not necessarily
different) sets of voters V, V ′ ⊆ N such that |V | = |V ′|, for each bijection ρ : V → V ′
and for each two approval preference profiles A ∈ A(C, V ) and A′ ∈ A(C, V ′) such
that A(v) = A′(ρ(v)) for each v ∈ V , it holds that R(A) = R(A′).
Neutrality. An ABC choice rule R is neutral if for each permutation σ of C and
each two approval preference profiles A,A′ ∈ A(C, V ) over the same voter set V with
σ(A) = A′ it holds that {σ(W ) : W ∈ R(A)} = R(A′).
Consistency. An ABC choice rule R is consistent if for each two profiles A and A′
over disjoint sets of voters, V ⊂ N and V ′ ⊂ N, V ∩ V ′ = ∅, if R(A)∩R(A′) 6= ∅ then
R(A + A′) = R(A) ∩R(A′).
Weak efficiency. An ABC choice rule R satisfies weak efficiency if for each approval
profile A, each winning committee W ∈ R(A), each candidate c ∈ W who is not
approved by any voter, and each candidate c′ /∈ W it holds that (W\{c})∪{c′} ∈ R(A).
Continuity. An ABC choice rule R satisfies continuity if for each two approval
profiles A and A′ with R(A) ∩ R(A′) = ∅, there exists a number n ∈ N such that
R(A + nA′) ⊆ R(A′).
Furthermore, note that D’Hondt proportionality and disjoint diversity only apply to
winning committees and hence can be used for ABC choice rules without modification. We
introduce one more axiom, which is more technical and necessary for our proof technique
to work, but which does not appear in the theorem statements.
2-Nonimposition. An ABC choice rule R satisfies 2-Nonimposition if for each two
committees W1,W2 ∈ Pk(C) there exists an approval profile α(W1,W2) such that
R(α(W1,W2)) = {W1,W2}.
Let us fix R to be an ABC ABC choice rule which satisfies symmetry, consistency, con-
tinuity, and 2-Nonimposition. We will show that R uniquely defines a corresponding ABC
ranking rule FR and that FR preservers many axiomatic properties. This observation will
allow us to apply our previous results to ABC choice rules. Let α be a fixed function from
Pk(C)×Pk(C) toA(C) such that for each two committeesW1,W2 ∈ Pk(C) it holds that
R(α(W1,W2)) = {W1,W2}. Such a function exists because R satisfies 2-Nonimposition.
We define FR as follows:
Definition 4. For each A ∈ A(C, V ) we define FR(A) so that for each W1,W2 ∈ Pk(C),
W1 FR(A) W2 ⇐⇒ ∃n∀n′≥n W1 ∈ R(A+ n
′α(W1,W2)).
As a consequence of Definition 4 we have
W1 ≻FR(A) W2 ⇐⇒ ∃n∀n′≥n R(A + n
′α(W1,W2)) = {W1}.
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The definition of FR seemingly depends on the choice of α. We show that this is not
the case.
Lemma 11. Let α, α′ be functions from Pk(C)×Pk(C) to A(C) such that R(α(W1,W2)) =
R(α′(W1,W2)) = {W1,W2} for any W1,W2 ∈ Pk(C). For every W1,W2 ∈ Pk(C) and
A ∈ A(C, V ),
∃s∀s′≥s W1 ∈ R(A+ s
′α(W1,W2)) ⇐⇒ ∃t∀t′≥t W1 ∈ R(A+ t
′α′(W1,W2)).
Proof. If W1 ∈ R(A), then by consistency W1 ∈ R(A + s
′α(W1,W2)) and W1 ∈ R(A +
t′α′(W1,W2)). If W1 /∈ R(A), then we can apply continuity and see that the equivalence
only fails if R(A+s′α(W1,W2)) = {W1} and R(A+t
′α′(W1,W2)) = {W2} (or vice versa).
By consistency,
R((A + s′α(W1,W2)) + t
′α′(W1,W2)) = {W1} and
R((A + t′α′(W1,W2)) + s
′α(W1,W2)) = {W2}.
This contradicts anonymity.
The following lemma now shows that the relation defined by Definition 4 is complete.
Lemma 12. For every W1,W2 ∈ Pk(C) at least on of the following two conditions holds:
1. ∃n∀n′≥n W1 ∈ R(A + n
′α(W1,W2)),
2. ∃n∀n′≥n W2 ∈ R(A + n
′α(W1,W2)).
Proof. If W1 ∈ R(A), then by consistency the first condition is satisfied; if W2 ∈ R(A),
then the second condition is satisfied. Let us consider what happens if W1,W2 /∈ R(A).
By continuity, we know that there must exist an n ∈ N such that R(A + nα(W1,W2)) ⊆
R(α(W1,W2)) = {W1,W2}. Thus,W1 ∈ R(A+nα(W1,W2)), orW2 ∈ R(A+nα(W1,W2))
holds. Without loss of generality, let us assume that W1 ∈ R(A+nα(W1,W2)). Then, by
consistency, for each n′ ≥ n it holds that: W1 ∈ R((A+nα(W1,W2)+(n
′−n)α(W1,W2)) =
R((A + n′α(W1,W2)).
Lemma 13. If R satisfies symmetry, then so does FR (cf. Definition 4). The same holds
for consistency, weak efficiency, and continuity.
Proof. (Anonymity) Let V, V ′ ⊂ N such that |V | = |V ′|. Further, let A ∈ A(C, V ) and
A′ ∈ A(C, V ′) so that A′ can be obtained from A by permuting its votes. We have to
show that for all W1,W2 ∈ Pk(C), W1 FR(A) W2 ⇐⇒ W1 FR(A′) W2. This follows
from the fact that R(A + n′α(W1,W2)) = R(A
′ + n′α(W1,W2)) by anonymity of R.
(Neutrality) Let σ be a permutation of C and let A,A′ ∈ A(C, V ) such that σ(A) = A′.
We have to show that for all W1,W2 ∈ Pk(C), W1 FR(A) W2 ⇐⇒ σ(W1) FR(A′)
σ(W2), i.e., ∃n∀n′≥n W1 ∈ R(A + n
′α(W1,W2)) ⇐⇒ ∃n∀n′≥n σ(W1) ∈ R(A
′ +
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n′α(σ(W1), σ(W2))). By Lemma 11 and neutrality of R, ∃n∀n′≥n σ(W1) ∈ R(A
′ +
n′α(σ(W1), σ(W2))) ⇐⇒ ∃n∀n′≥n σ(W1) ∈ R(σ(A) + σ(n
′α(W1,W2)). Again by neu-
trality of R, we have ∃n∀n′≥n σ(W1) ∈ R(σ(A)+σ(n
′α(W1,W2)) ⇐⇒ ∃n∀n′≥n σ(W1) ∈
σ(R(A + n′α(W1,W2)) ⇐⇒ ∃n∀n′≥n W1 ∈ R(A + n
′α(W1,W2)).
(Consistency) Let us first prove Statement (i) from the definition of consistency and
for this let W1,W2 ∈ Pk(C) with W1 ≻FR(A) W2 and W1 FR(A′) W2. Due to the fact
that W1 ≻FR(A) W2 and W1 FR(A′) W2 and by Definition 4, there exists an n with
R(A+n′α(W1,W2)) = {W1} for all n
′ ≥ n and W1 ∈ R(A
′+n′α(W1,W2)) for all n
′ ≥ n.
Since R(A + n′α(W1,W2)) ∩ R(A
′ + n′α(W1,W2)) 6= ∅, consistency of R implies that
R(A + n′α(W1,W2) + A
′ + n′α(W1,W2)) = {W1}, for all n
′ ≥ n. By anonymity, R(A +
A′ + 2n′α(W1,W2)) = {W1} for all n
′ ≥ n. Hence W1 ≻FR(A+A′) W2. Statement (ii) can
be shown analogously except that it suffices to show thatW1 ∈ R(A+A
′+2n′α(W1,W2)).
(Weak efficiency) Let W1,W2 ∈ Pk(C) and A ∈ A(C, V ) such that no voter approves
a candidate in W2 \W1. If ∃n∀n′≥n W1 ∈ R(A + n
′α(W1,W2)), then W1 FR(A) W2.
Otherwise, by Lemma 12 we know that ∃n∀n′≥n W2 ∈ R(A + n
′α(W1,W2)). Since R
satisfies weak efficiency, we get that W2 ∈ R(A + n
′α(W1,W2)) implies W1 ∈ R(A +
n′α(W1,W2)), and so by the definition of FR we get that W1 FR(A) W2.
(Continuity) Let W1,W2 ∈ Pk(C) and let A and A
′ be two approval profiles with
R(A)∩R(A′) = ∅, and withW1 ≻FR(A′) W2. Thus, for sufficiently large n, for each n
′ ≥ n,
it holds that R(A′ + n′α(W1,W2)) = {W1}. Since R satisfies continuity, for sufficiently
large n′′, for each n′′′ ≥ n′′ it holds that R(A + n′′′(A′ + n′α(W1,W2))) = {W1}. This
proves that W1 ≻FR(A+n′′′A′) W2 and thus continuity of FR.
We now show that winners selected by R and by FR are the same.
Lemma 14. Let A ∈ A(C, V ) and W ∈ Pk(C). It holds that W ∈ R(A) if and only if
W is a winning committee in FR(A).
Proof. Let W ∈ R(A); we will show that W is maximal in FR(A). Let W
′ ∈ Pk(C). By
consistency of R, W ∈ R(A + n′α(W,W ′)) for any n′. Hence W FR(A) W
′. Since this
holds for every committee W ′, we infer that W is a winning committee.
Let W be a winning committee in FR(A); we will show that W ∈ R(A). Let W
′ ∈
Pk(C) and towards a contradiction assume that W
′ ∈ R(A) but W /∈ R(A). Since W is
a winning committee in FR(A), it holds that ∃n∀n′≥n W ∈ R(A+n
′α(W,W ′)). However,
by consistency, R(A+ n′α(W,W ′)) = {W ′}, a contradiction.
Lemma 15. An ABC choice rule that satisfies consistency and D’Hondt proportionality
also satisfies 2-Nonimposition.
Proof. Let us fix two committees, W1 and W2, with W1 6= W2. For each two candidates,
c1 and c2, with c1 ∈ W1 \ W2 and c2 ∈ W2 \ W1 we construct the profile β(c1, c2) in
the following way. In β(c1, c2) there is one voter who approves c1 and c2. Further for
each candidate c ∈ W1 ∪W2 with c /∈ {c1, c2} we introduce one voter who approves of
c. Naturally, β(c1, c2) is a party-list profile. According to D’Hondt proportionality, each
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committee that consists of k candidates from W1 ∪W2 and does not contain both c1 and
c2 is winning in β(c1, c2). Now, let us consider the profile:
α(W1,W2) =
∑
c1∈W1\W2,c2∈W2\W1
β(c1, c2).
By consistency, W1 and W2 are the only winning committees in α(W1,W2), which com-
pletes the proof.
Theorem 5. Proportional Approval Voting is the only ABC choice rule that satisfies
symmetry, consistency, continuity and D’Hondt proportionality.
Proof. It is easy to verify that PAV satisfies symmetry, consistency, and continuity. By
Theorem 2, PAV satisfies D’Hondt proportionality. To prove the other direction, let R be
a function that satisfies symmetry, consistency, continuity and D’Hondt proportionality.
By Lemma 15, R satisfies 2-Nonimposition. Consequently, using Definition 4 we can
construct the ABC ranking rule FR. By Lemma 13, FR satisfies symmetry, consistency,
and continuity. By Lemma 14, the winning committees in FR and are the same as winning
committees in R. Since D’Hondt proportionality concerns only winning committees,
FR also satisfies D’Hondt proportionality. By Theorem 2 we infer that FR is PAV. By
Lemma 14 we get that R has exactly the same winning committees as FR, and so we
infer that R is PAV.
Next, we prove the characterization of the Approval Chamberlin–Courant rule.
Lemma 16. An ABC choice rule that satisfies symmetry, consistency and disjoint diver-
sity also satisfies 2-Nonimposition.
Proof. We fix two committees W1 andW2,W1 6= W2, and construct a profile α(W1,W2) in
the following way. LetM(W1,W2) denote the set of bijections from W1 \W2 to W2 \W1.
Fix m ∈ M(W1,W2) and let us construct profile βm(W1,W2) in the following way: For
each c ∈ W1 \W2, we introduce one voter who approves of {c,m(c)}; further, for each
candidate from c ∈ W1 ∩ W2 we introduce one voter who approves {c}. From disjoint
diversity and from symmetry we get that each committee that contains all candidates
from W1∩W2 and that for each matched pair (c,m(c)) contains either c or m(c) (but not
both of them), is winning.
Now, we construct the profile α(W1,W2) as follows:
α(W1,W2) =
∑
m∈M(W1,W2)
βm(W1,W2).
It follows from consistency that W1 and W2 are the only two winning committees.
By reasoning similar to the proof of Theorem 5, we obtain a characterization of CC.
Theorem 6. The Approval Chamberlin–Courant rule is the only non-trivial ABC choice
rule that satisfies symmetry, consistency, weak efficiency, continuity, and disjoint diver-
sity.
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Interestingly, our technique based on 2-Nonimposition cannot be used for proving an
axiomatic characterization of Multi-Winner Approval Voting.
Proposition 3. Multi-Winner Approval Voting does not satisfy 2-Nonimposition.
Proof. Let us take two committees, W1 and W2, such that |W1 \W2| = |W2 \W1| ≥ 2.
Consider a profile A whereW1 andW2 are unique winners. This means that each candidate
from W1 \W2 has the same approval score as each candidate from W2 \W1. Indeed, if
the approval score of some candidate c ∈ W1 \W2 were higher then the approval score of
some candidate c′ ∈ W2 \W1, then (W2 \ {c
′}) ∪ {c} would be a better committee than
W2, and so W2 would not be winning. But this means that for each c ∈ W1 \W2 and each
c′ ∈ W2 \W1, the committee (W1 \ {c}) ∪ {c
′} is as good as W1 according to AV, thus it
is also a winner. Consequently, W1 and W2 are not unique winners.
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